An Examination of the Significance of the Difference between the Neurotic Symptom and the Psychotic Sinthome.

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Chapter 1: Acknowledgments

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Chapter 2: Abstract

This thesis will examine Freud’s theory of the neurotic symptom and Lacan’s concept of the psychotic sinthome and will illustrate the significance of the difference between them. In addition, Freud and Lacan’s theories of the unconscious and symptom formation, specifically the mechanisms of repression and foreclosure and their consequences for the subject, will be examined. Case studies will facilitate the explanation of these theories.
Chapter 3: Introduction

Verhaeghe (2004) defines a symptom as an unconscious production that creates a compromise between conflicting impulses, and therefore bypasses the censoring line between the conscious and unconscious. Consequently, symptoms circumvent anxiety and unpleasure. The symptom is a “defensive construction within the signifier against the Real of the drive” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p.203). This production obeys a number of laws which can be formulated in linguistic terms, this makes it possible to analyse them using associative material (Verhaeghe, 2004).

Dor (1998) states, that Lacan sought to restore the Freudian originality of the experience of the unconscious. Lacan relates Freud’s formations of the unconscious (condensation and displacement) to language and names them metaphor and metonymy. Lacan (1957-1958) explains that the metaphoric purpose is the formation of new meaning, while the metonymic purpose is to distort. For Lacan (2006a) the unconscious is structured like a language and constituted from repressed signifiers. Bailly (2009) explains that the signifier alone is not repressed, but rather it is repressed in a particular relation to other signifiers in a signifying chain. The unconscious continually produces repressed signifiers that reveal themselves via the subject’s unconscious intentionality. Repression may conceal the signifier linked with an unpleasant emotion, but the affect remains free in the psyche, seeking out other signifiers with which to connect (Bailly, 2009). The reattachment process is not random but determined by an unconscious signifying chain, hence the possibility for psychoanalysis to re-attach/re-connect the affect to the apparently abstract object, by a work of retrieving the repressed signifying chain.
from the unconscious via free association (Bailly, 2009). This forms the basis of Freud’s theory of displacement. In certain cases a signifier can be completely erased rather than repressed, by a process known as foreclosure which forms the structure for psychosis (Bailly, 2009).

People can obtain a certain satisfaction from their dissatisfaction in life. Lacan nominates the pleasure that symptoms provide as ‘jouissance’ (Fink, 1997). For Freud symptoms provide substitute satisfactions, however these substitutes do not always provide a permanent solution (Fink, 1997). The moment that an individual seeks therapy can thus be understood as one in which a breakdown occurs in their preferred way of obtaining ‘jouissance’. The jouissance-providing symptom is no longer functioning and has been jeopardised (Fink, 1997). The subject seeks therapy to be relieved, not of the symptom but of its recent inadequacy so that their satisfaction can be restored to its previous level, and in its place the therapist offers an alternative substitute satisfaction (Fink, 1997).
Chapter 4: Discussion

4.1. The Symptom

4.1.1. The Interpretation of Dreams

Lacan (2006b) emphasises that in relation to the interpretation of dreams it is the rhetoric that is important. This is also applicable to the symptom; it is in speaking about the symptom that the unconscious intentionality is revealed. Freud explains that dreams can be expressed as “a (disguised) fulfilment of a suppressed (or repressed) wish” (Freud, 1900, p. 160). According to Freud (1900) dreams contain both a manifest and latent agency. The manifest content of the dream is what is consciously remembered upon waking, and the latent content is the motivation or the hidden content behind the dream. Freud (1900) claims that for this latent thought or idea to make its way into consciousness it must be disguised in a way that is acceptable to the censorship which modifies and disguises the content of the dreams. Freud asserts that it is for this reason that images in dreams are often not what they appear to be, and need further interpretation if they are to reveal the hidden wishes of the unconscious. Freud (1900) refers to the process of censoring and distorting dream content into less disturbing images as ‘the dreamwork’ and explicitly identifies two distinct processes through which dreams are censored; condensation and displacement.
4.1.2. Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious

An example of how condensation and displacement function can be observed in Freud’s (1905) joke regarding the ‘famillionaire’, in which the unconscious intentionality behind the speaker’s speech is revealed. Allusion toward a double meaning is achieved by utilising two similar sounding words that form a new composite word through compression, combination and substitution. An abbreviation or omission aids the creation of the paradoxical signifier ‘famillionaire’. This is the basis of the comical effect occurring. An example of condensation or metaphor can be observed in the compressing force that results in the less resistant word disappearing and the creation of the neologism ‘famillionaire’. An illustration of displacement or metonymy can be witnessed in the fusing of the two similar words together. The humour pertains to the thought contained with the joke, which involves the subtle derision of the millionaire for his condescension towards those that are not millionaires.

4.1.3. The Parapraxes of everyday Life

Verhaeghe (2004) explains that because of the linguistic structure of the unconscious, free association is in fact not actually free, but operates according to the automaton. Free association is lawfully determined in the chain of signifiers, where certain syllables refer repeatedly to the repressed name. Lacan discusses chance in terms of its Aristotelian division; chance for subjects (tuchè) and chance for objects (automaton). For Lacan (1964) tuchè pertains to the Real and he designates it as the object of repetition. It refers to uncontrollable circumstances and unforeseen events and is viewed as an impossible encounter with the unexpected. These encounters are always missed encounters because they cannot be prepared
for. The Real consists of pure chance alone. For Lacan (1964) automaton pertains to the symbolic. Systematic determinism refers to the productions /formations of the unconscious, determined in a systematic way. Automaton is the insistence of the network of signifiers. It is the structure within which the chance (or trauma) takes place, and it is because of this structure that the random event repeats itself. Repetition belongs to the Symbolic, but its object or cause is situated in the Real. The Symbolic places it in a chain and a pattern emerges. The form of the symptoms is determined by the Symbolic but the cause of the symptom is in the Real. This automatic memory is the theoretical basis for the practice of free-association. However, a point is reached where the chain of signifiers stops. When that occurs, a second line has to begin. Where the chain stalls, the real appears. The encounter with the Real is a missed encounter because there is no signifier for it. Thus, it is not only the symbolic that has a determining effect, the Real also has a causal function, and the two of them converge in the symptom (Lacan, 1964).

An example of this can be viewed upon examination of Freud’s ‘Signorelli’. The parapraxis involved in the example of the ‘Signorelli’ is a paramnesia, in which a name is wrongly remembered and a hetronymic substitute is presented in place of the forgotten name. Lacan defines hetronymic substitution as “the translation of a term into a foreign language on the plane of the existence at the level of the phenomenon of language of several linguistic systems” (Lacan, 1957-1958, p.31). He explains that it is here that the substitutive level is rediscovered, because substitution is the articulation, the signifying means in which the act of metaphor is established (Lacan, 1957-1958). Metaphor is produced within the level of substitution. This means that substitution is a way in which the signifier can be articulated, and that metaphor
operates there with its function as creator of the signified at that place where substitution may be produced (Lacan, 1957-1958).

Freud (1901) classifies parapraxes as an act whose explicit goal is not attained; instead, this goal appears to have been replaced by another one. Lacan (1957-1958) states that there is always a substitution present when something is forgotten, as this is one of the laws of metaphorical substitution; and that this substitute comes from the ‘Other’. He refers to these substitutions as the metonymical ruins from which the unconscious intentionality can be reconstructed. In the case of the ‘Signorelli’ a metonymical approximation occurs where the replacement words emerge at first. Displacement of the name occurs, from ‘Signorelli’ to ‘Botticelli’ and ‘Boltraffio’. Lacan (1957-1958) states that in this case of the analysis of a forgetting, the indirect relationships that are linked solely to phenomena of the signifier are what are important. This displacement is motivated by repression of the thought of Freud’s patient that died by suicide. Verhaeghe (2004) explains that the forgetting of the name ‘Signorelli’ is an attempt at avoiding unpleasurable thoughts of impotence and death. “The failing is consequently his failing, and it is this that he cannot or will not admit to the Other. The symptom covers it up – recovery indeed” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p.199).

Freud (1901) reveals that parapraxes, like symptoms, are compromise-formations resulting from the antagonism between the subject's conscious intentions and what has been repressed. Freud (1901) defines compromise formations as the form that is taken by the repressed memory, so as to be admitted to consciousness when it returns in symptoms, in dreams and, more generally, in all products of the unconscious. In the process the repressed ideas are
distorted by defence mechanisms, such as condensation and displacement, to the point of being unrecognisable. Thus both the unconscious wish and the demands of defence may be satisfied by the same formation, in a single compromise. A compromise formation occurs in this instance as Freud’s parapraxis reminds him just as much of that which he wants to forget, as of that which he wants to remember. He forgets one thing against his will, while he wants to forget the other thing intentionally. The names in this case are treated as pictograms in a sentence which have to be reconstructed into a rebus.

Verhaeghe (2004) states, that the example of the Signorelli can serve as an illustration of every form of symptom construction, for example dreams, parapraxes, conversion, obsessional thoughts and phobias. What Verhaeghe (2004) emphasises is that each form is constructed in relation to the ‘Other’. Verhaeghe (2004) illustrates that every symptom is an attempt to express and master the original drive impulse through signifiers, and hence through the ‘Other’. Simultaneously, as the symptom is constructed, a certain identity is formed for both the subject and the ‘Other’. However, no single symptom succeeds in finally covering up the original Real. The failure of this process is a structural necessity, resulting in the asymptomatic construction of symptoms.

Freud (1901) explains that the mechanism of parapraxes can be seen to correspond in its most essential points with the mechanism of dream-formation. In both cases condensation, displacement and compromise-formation can be found. Freud (1901) states that the same situation exists in both cases, by the way of external associations and unknown pathways, unconscious thoughts find expression as modifications of other thoughts. Freud (1901) explains
that the incongruities, absurdities and inaccuracies of the dream-content, which result in the dream being scarcely recognised as the product of psychical activity, originate in the same way, as are our common mistakes in everyday life. He asserts that in both cases the appearance of an incorrect function is explained by the peculiar mutual interference between two or several correct functions (Freud, 1901). Freud (1901) affirms that psychoneurotic symptoms, especially the psychical formations of hysteria and obsessional neuroses, repeat in their mechanism all the essential features of this operation of working. Freud (1901) explains that in every case, the phenomena can be traced back to incompletely suppressed psychical material, which although repressed by the consciousness, has nonetheless not been robbed of all capacity for expressing itself.

Verhaeghe (2004) illustrates that for both Freud and Lacan every symptom is a compromise and is always an attempt at a solution. It can be viewed as an imaginary way of responding to the lack in the symbolic and, with regard to the real, that provokes anxiety. “The symptom takes its place in the subsequent elaboration of the original border signifier” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p.199). Verhaeghe (1995) explains that at least two signifiers are required in order to have a minimal linguistic structure. He goes on to describe the two terms the S1 and S2. The S1, is the first signifier, the Freudian ‘border signifier’, ‘primary symbol’, even ‘primary symptom’ and it has a special status. It is the master-signifier, trying to fill up the lack, posing as the guarantee for the process of covering up that lack. Verhaeghe (1995) states that the best and shortest example is the signifier “I” which gives the illusion of an identity. The S2 is the denominator for the rest of the signifiers, the chain or network of signifiers. In that sense, it is also the denominator of ‘le savoir’, the knowledge which is contained in that chain. Verhaeghe
(1995) illustrates that the next two terms are both an effect of the signifier. Indeed, once two signifiers are present, the necessary condition for the existence of a subject is fulfilled; “remember: a signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier”, (Verhaeghe, 1995, p.7). Therefore, the third term is the divided subject $. The last of the terms, indeed, last but not least, is the lost object, notated as ‘object a’ (Verhaeghe, 1995).

However, Verhaeghe (2004) explains that this does not mean that the symptom is a purely imaginary construction, and states that to reduce it to this would mean that its substratum is forgotten, which is fundamental to the construction itself. In reference to Dora’s attacks of coughing and hoarseness, Freud utilises a metaphor to explain this phenomenon.

“In the lowest stratum we must assume the presence of a real and organically determined irritation in the throat – which acted like a grain of sand around which an oyster forms it’s pearl” (Freud 1901-1905, p.83).

Verhaeghe (2004) clarifies that the grain of sand is of the order of the real and of the tuché, to be defended against. He explains that the pearl is the automaton-reaction to it, producing the envelope or container, specifically the visible and external aspect of the symptom. Verhaeghe (2004) states, that on the inside the original real starting point remains effective as a ‘foreign body’. In the case of Dora’s hysteria, Freud refers to an “organic factor which was the source of the ‘somatic compliance’ that enabled her to express her love for a man who was periodically absent” (Freud, 1901-1905, p.41). This ‘somatic compliance’ allows the unconscious mental processes a physical outlet. Verhaeghe (2004) notes, that something of the body is present in the kernel of every symptom. He alludes to this as being the ‘root’ of the drive or the point of fixation, and states that following Lacan, the ‘objet a’ can also be placed in this position.
Freud (1901-1905) goes on to explain that Dora’s irritation was susceptible to fixation as it concerned a part of her body that had to a high degree retained its significance as an erotogenic zone. Therefore the irritation was suited to allow expression to excited states of the libido (Freud, 1901-1905). Dora’s symptom was brought to fixation by what Freud (1901-1905) refers to as probably being its first psychical coating, her symptomatic imitation of her father; and by her subsequent self reproaches on account of her ‘catarrh’. The same symptoms reveal themselves as capable of representing Dora’s relations with Herr K., allowing her to express her regret at his absence and her wish to make him a better wife (Freud, 1901-1905). After a part of her libido had once again turned towards her father, the symptom obtained what was perhaps its last meaning; it came to represent sexual intercourse with her father by means of Dora identifying herself with Frau K (Freud, 1901-1905).

Freud (1917) states that, the sexual instincts are constantly striving towards the attainment of pleasure. The ego instincts begin with the same aim but are also regulated by reality and experience. Therefore the ego becomes ruled by the reality principal while the sexual instincts remain ruled by the pleasure principal. Freud (1917), explains that contradictory aims unite in the symptom. The symptom provides, through both its unconscious wish fulfilment and its conscious suffering, a compromise that reconciles these aims. Freud (1926), compares a symptom to a foreign body which is keeping up a constant succession of stimuli and reactions in the tissue in which it was embedded. Freud (1926), states that it can sometimes transpire that the defensive struggle against an unwelcome instinctual impulse, is concluded with the formation of a symptom. This is most often possible in hysterical conversion. However, generally the outcome is different and the initial act of repression is followed by a tedious or incessant development in
which the struggle against the instinctual impulse is prolonged into a struggle against the symptom.

4.2. The Symbolic Order and Language

Lacan’s view is that language is the characteristic that sets human beings apart from animals; humans are speaking beings (‘parlêtre’) (Bailly, 2009). Bailly (2009) illustrates that Lacan hypothesised a structural mirroring between what people say and how they think.

“For Lacan, the unconscious is comprised of symbolic elements, and because we are speaking beings for whom language is the main vehicle of representation, its building blocks are words, and its structure is grammatical” (Bailly, 2009, p.42).

Lacan rewrote Saussure’s ‘the sign’ as \( \frac{S}{s} \) or \( \frac{\text{signifier}}{\text{signified}} \) emphasising the connection between signifiers, rather than between the signifier and the signified. Bailly (2009) explains the importance of the bar as representing the resistance to meaning inherent in language. The act of crossing the bar, the act in which signification, or meaning, is produced is quintessentially human. It represents the acquisition of language and the subsequent formation of the unconscious, which allows conceptual representation (Bailly, 2009).

Lacan (2006b) explains that the law of man is the law of language. Language determines the system of human organisation and is intertwined with speech. He illustrates that gifts are objects of symbolic exchange. They are the signifiers of the pact that they constitute as the
signified (Lacan, 2006b). Bianchi (2010) illustrates how Lacan is trying to mythically imagine the moment when those objects that had been useful and instrumentally linked to their purpose were emptied out of their instrumentality and became symbols. At the very moment when they are inscribed in a register other than the one of immediate usefulness, they are in the organization of language and signifier. A cut has been traced in those objects that separate them from themselves; and this cut creates the space in order to re-articulate their own inscription in the register of the symbolic (Bianchi, 2010).

Lacan (2006b) emphasises that the symptom, whether neurotic, perverse, or psychotic; are sustained by a linguistic structure, by signifiers, and by the letters that serve as their material element. In his study of linguistics Lacan (2006b) distinguishes between synchronic and diachronic structuring in language. Evans (1996) illustrates that the signifying chain is both of these things. In its diachronic dimension it is linear, syntagmatic, metonymic; in its synchronic dimension it is circular, associative, metaphoric. The two cross over:

“There is in effect no signifying chain [diachronic chain] that does not have, as if attached to the punctuation of each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts [synchronous units] suspended ‘vertically’, as it were, from that point.” (Lacan, 2006b, p.154)

Therefore, Lacan combines in one concept the two types of relationship (‘syntagmatic’ and ‘associative’) which Saussure argued existed between signs, though for Lacan, the relationship is between signifiers, not signs (Evans, 1996). Lacan (2006b) states that this distinction enables the understanding of the different value that language takes on in the interpretation of resistances and
transference. It also allows the differentiation between the effects characteristic of repression and the structure of the individual myth in obsessive neurosis (Lacan, 2006b).

Lacan accentuates the importance of the symbolic order in psychoanalysis and refers to Freud’s discovery of the field of affects in man’s nature, and of his relations to the symbolic order. Lacan outlines that it is the “world of words that creates the world of things” (Lacan, 2006, p.229), rather than vice versa; and that man speaks because the symbol has made him man. Lacan (2006b) states that it is the primordial law that organises the entire structure of human society, as it is what regulates marriage ties and prohibits incest. The laws of language allow this prohibition and regulation to exist because they provide the names for these kinship relations. It is the dissolution of the Oedipus complex that allows the individual to take up a position as a subject in the symbolic order, and to accept the order of things. The paternal metaphor provides the basis for the entire symbolic function and represents the figure of the law. According to Lacan (2006b) it is discordances in the paternal relation that leads to pathogenic effects in the individual. Human beings are born into the symbolic order, into the discourse of the ‘Other’. Symbols engender them before they are born, and words constitute their destiny. For example in Freud’s case of the ‘Rat man’ “the child will be either a great man or a great criminal” (Freud, 1909, p.205).
4.2.1. The Relation of Language to Speech

Lacan (2006b) explains that in the relation of language to speech three paradoxes exist. Firstly, in the psychotic subject where there is an absence of speech, and the subject is spoken instead of speaking. In the psychotic subject there is a lack of symbolic quilting points which for the neurotic provide fixed points of identification for the subject (Lacan 1955-1956). Therefore there is a constant slippage of signifier over signified, which leads to a constant sliding of meaning; language and meaning proliferate and invade the subject, becoming sources of persecution (Lacan, 1955-1956). Secondly, in neuroses where Lacan (2006b) describes a symptom as being the signifier of the signified, repressed from the subject’s consciousness. He explains that this occurs when speech is driven out of the subject’s concrete discourse that orders consciousness. It then finds its medium in either the subject’s natural functions, or the images that organise their relational structuring.

According to Lacan (2006b), the symptom is structured like a language and can be resolved in the analysis of language. He states that a symptom is language from which speech must be delivered. Thirdly, in the subject who loses meaning in the objectifications of his own discourse; whereby when the subject speaks about himself an objectification occurs, subjectivity is forgotten and alienation of the subject occurs. According to Lacan (2006b) this can transpire, whereby language is reduced to a vehicle of communication alone, as specified for example, via the discourse of science, in which the subject is objectified. He illustrates that a wall of language also blocks speech and causes alienation in the decomposed trinity of the ego, superego and the
id. He emphasises the importance of full speech, as opposed to empty speech (ego to ego) in psychoanalysis which engages the subject.

4.3. Schema R

4.3.1. Schema L

It is important to outline Schema L as it is the foundation of Schema R. The main point of Schema L is to show the relationship between the ‘Other’ and the Subject. Schema L also illustrates the relationship between the Ego and the ‘Other’ in conjunction with the relationship between Language and Speech.

Dor (1998) illustrates that the relationship between the ego and the ‘Other’ is analogous to the relationship between language and speech. This analogy illustrates the fundamental problem of the alienation of the subject in the ego as a consequence of the accession to language, as demonstrated in Schema L (Appendix A). Dor (1998) states that S represents the subject, caught in the net of language and who does not know what he is saying. Lacan’s mirror stage describes the subject’s achievement of identity through an image, at first experienced through the specular image of an ‘other’, and then assumed as one’s own. As the subject begins with the image of the other before consenting to his own identity, he will enter into a subjective movement correlative with the ‘other’. “This form of the ‘other’ has a very close relation to his ego; it can be superimposed on the ego, and we write it as o” (Lacan, 1954-1955, p.244, cited in
Dor, 1998, p.162). Dor (1998) clarifies that the subject’s relation with himself is therefore always mediated by a fictional line, the axis oo’. The relation of S to o (ego) is therefore dependent on o’, and inversely, the subject’s relation to the other (o’), his fellow being, is dependent on o. There exists a “dialectic of identification of oneself with the other and of the other with oneself” (Dor, 1998, p. 162).

Dor (1998) further explains that the fourth term of Schema L is symbolized by ‘O’, the ‘Other’. He states that apart from the symmetrical plane of the ego and the other, there is a secant plane (O→S) that Lacan names the ‘wall of language’. Because of the division produced by language, when a true subject speaks to another true subject he never reaches him directly. This true ‘Other’ is in effect situated on the other side of the ‘wall of language’, just as the subject himself is separated from his truth as a subject by this same order of language (Dor, 1998). Dor states that “the entire question of the alienation of the subject (“I”) in and by language is played out to the advantage of the imaginary order of the ego” (Dor, 1998, p.164). “The subject doesn’t know what he is saying, and for the best of reasons, because he doesn’t know what he is” (Lacan, 1954-1955, p. 244, cited in Dor, 1998, p.164). Lacan outlines that the aim of analysis must be the:

“passage of true speech, joining the subject to an other subject, on the other side of the wall of language. That is the final relation of the subject to a genuine Other, to the Other who gives the answer one doesn’t expect, which defines the terminal point of the analysis” (Lacan, 1954-1955, p.246, cited in Dor, 1998, p.164).
4.3.2. The Borromean Knot

Lacan designed Schema R to account more directly for what he termed the “field of reality”, which he later termed “the real”. Schema R is a direct precursor of Lacan’s Borromean topology. The Borromean knot (Appendix B) begins as three overlapping rings designated as Imaginary, Symbolic and Real. The triad evolves into a potential quaternary structure when in ‘Le Sinthome’ (Lacan, 2005), he designates sinthome as a fourth register.

According to Lacan, there is no genuinely symbolic dimension, and therefore no functioning unconscious, in psychosis (Fink, 2007). Fink (2007) explains that while all three dimensions (imaginary, symbolic and real) are generally present in psychosis; they are not tied together and do not operate together, as they do in neurosis. Essentially, in neurosis, these three dimensions become firmly tied together by the formation of a kind of knot; a knot referred to by Freud as the Oedipus complex, and that Lacan termed the ‘paternal metaphor’ (Fink, 2007). In psychosis, the ‘sinthome’ takes the place of the Oedipus complex, in tying the three dimensions together with a kind of ‘nonstandard knot’, and prevents the imaginary from becoming completely detached from the real (Fink, 2007). Occasionally, things such as a life partner, an artistic endeavour or a particular occupation or activity can allow the subject to maintain his body image, language and jouissance working together; for example Joyce’s writing that “allows him to keep body and soul together” (Fink, 2007, p.265). It is possible in certain cases for the psychotic’s ‘sinthome’ to begin to disintegrate or come untied under the pressure of certain life circumstances that “threaten the stability of the individual’s solution to the problem of keeping body and soul together, so to speak” (Fink, 2007, p.265). The goal of the analyst in
such cases is to aid the analysand either in the discovery of a means to return to the previous stability, or to find a new situation that will lead to the formation of either the same or a different type of stability (Fink, 2007). Lacan suggested, however, that in schizophrenia all of the symbolic is real; therefore there are not really three dimensions that could even potentially be tied together in schizophrenia (Fink, 2007).

4.3.3. Schema R

In contrast to Freud, Lacan describes the Oedipus complex as a Triad: (i) the Mother, (ii) the Child, and (iii) the Imaginary Phallus (denoted as φ). For Lacan the Imaginary Phallus represents the mother’s desire/lack that the child tries to embody. Through identification with the Phallus the child attempts to become the object of Satisfaction for the mother. The Father is required to intervene as a symbolic representation of the Law. He represents social order and the cultural imperative. He prohibits the incestuous desire for the Mother and overwrites the desire of the Mother. This is a metaphoric substitution; the desire of the Mother is substituted by the Name of the Father. The master signifier is repressed and the child’s jouissance is regulated. This master signifier has been described previously by Verhaeghe (1995), as being equivalent to the ‘border signifier’, ‘primary symbol’, or ‘primary symptom’. The Paternal Metaphor castrates both the child and the Mother.

Through castration the child takes on desire as a sexed being. Castration provides the child with an Ego-Ideal and the means to sublimate sexual impulses until bodily maturation reached after latency period. It allows the child to take up a subjective position in the world.
Castration also leads to the formation of the Superego. Through castration the child moves from an Imaginary Position to a Symbolic Position. Therefore the subject can come into being due to the subjectivity in language. The Father intervenes as both (i) Prohibiting and Depriving and (ii) Permissive and Giving. Prohibition, via the agency that represses, gives rise to the Superego; and the promise via the agency that sublimates, gives rise to the Ego Ideal. Therefore Schema R involves three Stages: (i) The child seeks to be or not to be the object of the Mother’s desire. (ii) The moment of Privation of the Oedipus complex, where the Father deprives the Mother. Her law is now subject to the law of the Father. (iii) Identification with the Father and the virtual title to have what the father has at a later stage. For Lacan, where the name of the father is foreclosed psychosis emerges as a clinical structure, and where it is disavowed, perversion emerges as a clinical structure; whilst repression is the mechanism that structures the neurosis.

4.5. Neurosis

Freud (1893-1895) describes the hysterical symptom as a psychical conflict converted into a bodily symptom. Lacan (1957-1958) defines the neurotic symptom as the result of a psychical conflict that has been repressed, distorted and expressed through the medium of the body. It is a physical manifestation of repressed thoughts. Lacan (1957-1958) states that the symptom functions as a metaphor in which the body or significance is taken as its signifying element, it is the ‘word written in the body’. Freud (1893-1895) explains that with hysteric patients, the negative thought is repressed so that it is not consciously remembered and then the painful affect is converted into a bodily or somatic symptom, of which there is no apparent biological cause. Freud states that a symptom, like a dream, represents a wish fulfilment.
Therefore the hysterical symptom can be viewed both as a symbolisation and manifestation of a psychical conflict, and as a phantasy that represents the fulfilment of a wish.

Freud (1917) portrays neurotic symptoms as acts that are harmful or at least useless to the subject’s life. These symptoms are often complained of as being unwelcome and of causing ‘unpleasure’ or suffering. In addition, they frequently claim a large capacity of the subject’s mental energy. Freud (1926) describes the neurotic symptom as a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in suspension; it is a consequence of the process of repression. He explains that repression proceeds from the ego when it (perhaps at the command of the superego) refuses to associate itself with an instinctual cathexis which has been aroused in the id. The ego is able by means of repression, to keep the idea which is the vehicle of the reprehensible impulse, from becoming conscious. Freud (1926) states that, analysis reveals that the idea often persists as an unconscious formation. Freud (1917) explains that the libido, having being rejected by the superego in its object-cathexis, is forced to turn away from reality and consciousness and negotiate the path of regression. It then seeks satisfaction in one of the earlier infantile organizations, or from a discarded past object. The libido pursues the path of regression, and is led by the various points of fixation left behind in its development. This is how the symptom is formed.

Freud (1926) states that, with obsessional neurosis and paranoia the forms which the symptoms assume become very valuable to the ego, because they obtain for it, a narcissistic satisfaction which the ego would otherwise be without. The systems which the obsessional neurotic constructs flatter his self-love by making him feel that he is better than other people
because he is exceptionally clean or conscientious. The delusional constructions of the paranoiac offer to his acute perceptive and imaginative powers a field of activity which he could not easily find elsewhere. Freud (1916-1917) explains that this results in a ‘secondary gain from illness’ which follows a neurosis. This gain comes to the assistance of the ego in its attempt to incorporate the symptom and increases the symptom's fixation. Freud (1926) states that, when the analyst attempts to help the ego in its struggle against the symptom, it is discovered that these conciliatory bonds between ego and symptom operate on the side of the resistances, and that they are not undone without difficulty. Freud (1926) illustrates how the ego incorporates the symptom to make it part of itself. The symptom, being the true substitute for and derivative of the repressed impulse, carries on the role of the impulse. It continually renews its demands for satisfaction, and thus obliges the ego in its turn, to give the signal of unpleasure, and put itself in a posture of defence.

When Freud (1926) states that in degrading a process of satisfaction to a symptom, repression demonstrates its influence in a further respect. Freud (1900-1901) illustrates that there are two possible issues for any single unconscious excitation-process. Either it is left to itself, in which case it ultimately breaks through somewhere and secures, on this one occasion, a discharge for its excitation into motility, or it succumbs to the influence of the preconscious, and through this its excitation becomes bound instead of being discharged. It is the latter case that occurs in the dream-process. Freud (1926) clarifies that if possible the substitutive process is prevented from finding discharge through motility. However, even if this cannot be done, the process is forced to expend itself in making alterations in the subject's own body, and is not
permitted to impose upon the external world. It must not be transformed into action. For in repression the ego is operating under the influence of external reality and therefore it prohibits the substitutive process from having any effect upon that reality (Freud, 1926). Freud (1926) explains, that in the way the ego controls the path to action in regard to the external world, it also controls access to consciousness. In repression it implements its control in both directions, acting simultaneously upon the instinctual impulse itself, and also in the other direction, upon the psychical representative of that impulse.

Freud (1926) states that, it is important not to ignore the role that anxiety plays in neurotic symptom formation. When the ego identifies the threat of castration, it presents the indicator of anxiety and inhibits through the pleasure-unpleasure agency the impending cathectic process in the id. Concurrently the phobia is formed. The castration anxiety is then directed to a different object and expressed in a distorted form, so that the patient is afraid, not of being castrated by his father, but of something else, as for example, in the case of Little Hans being bitten by a horse, or in the case of the ‘wolf man’ being devoured by a wolf. Freud (1926) states, that this substitutive formation has two obvious advantages. (i) Firstly, it avoids a conflict due to ambivalence, because the father is simultaneously loved and feared. (ii) Secondly, it enables the ego to stop producing anxiety. Freud (1926) explains that this is because the anxiety belonging to a phobia is conditional. It only materialises when the object of the phobia is present since it is only then that the danger-situation is present. There is no need to be afraid of being castrated by a father who is not there. Freud (1926) explains that an individual cannot however dispose of their father, who can appear whenever he desires. However, if the fear of the father is replaced
by the fear of an animal, the animal has to merely be avoided in order to be free from both the perceived threat and anxiety.

Therefore, what occurs in a phobia is simply that one external danger is replaced by another. Freud (1926) clarifies that with a phobia it is possible for the ego to escape anxiety by means of avoidance or of inhibitory symptoms, which is comparable with the theory that anxiety is only an affective signal and that no alteration has taken place in the economic situation. Freud (1926), states that this position is essentially identical to that of the adult neurotic symptom. He gives the example of the agoraphobic patient that imposes a restriction on his ego so as to escape a certain instinctual danger, specifically the danger of surrendering to his erotic desires. If he yields to his desires then the threat of being castrated, or some related danger, would be fabricated yet again, as it was in his childhood (Freud, 1926).

In discussion of Freud’s (1909) case study of Little Hans, Lebovici (1982) states that, his Oedipus complex represents the model of the nuclear core of neurosis in childhood. These anxiety neuroses, in Freud’s terms, are otherwise known as phobias. Phobias in children comprise a particular association to Oedipal difficulties, specifically in relation to the functioning of the paternal metaphor. Lacan states that these phobias represent a type of movement around the clinical structures for the subject; phobia being a gateway to neurosis or perversion, and a difficulty in moving from the pre-Oedipal tie (Lebovici, 1982). Felluga (2011) describes how for Freud, a neurosis is the formation of behavioural or psychosomatic symptoms, as a result of the
return of the repressed. For Freud (1901-1905) the Oedipus complex is the nuclear complex of the neuroses.

4.6. Psychosis

For Freud, the mechanism at stake in psychosis is projection, whilst for Lacan, it is foreclosure (Dean, 2005). Freud asserted that, psychosis was a form of primary narcissism (Dean, 2005). Laplanche & Pontalis (2006) point out that, Freud went through at least two phases in his writings about psychosis. In the first phase, Freud tied his explanation of psychosis to his theory of sexuality. In the second phase Freud tied his theory of psychosis to libidinal instincts and narcissism. Dean (2005) explains that, Freud also makes a structural distinction between paranoia and dementia praecox, where what distinguishes dementia praecox from paranoia is that the latter has the process of projection, and the former hallucinatory hysteria. It is from this concept of projection that Lacan derives his concept of foreclosure.

4.6.1. Freud – Psychosis as a Defence Against Homosexuality

Freud's (1911) understanding of psychosis is situated in the context of his theory of repression. He explains that there are three stages in repression: (i) Fixation/Primal Repression occurs at the first stage and is a necessary condition for repression to occur. In psychosexual development a drive, or a component of a drive, gets fixated at a particular stage. These fixations are the basis of subsequent illnesses as they constitute weak points in the psyche. Freud (1911)
states that individuals who are fixated at the point of narcissism are exposed to the danger that some unusually intense wave of libido, finding no other outlet, may lead to a sexualisation of their social instincts and so undo the sublimations which had been achieved over the course of their development. Primal repression is the first ideational representative that serves as the basis of the unconscious. Primal repression occurs at the oral stage of development with the initial formation of the ego and coincides with the acquisition of language. (ii) Repression Proper occurs when the ego encounters unacceptable libidinal currents or psychical trends, and it seeks to push these ideas out of consciousnesses. This can only occur if there is an already existing association with material that has already been fixated or primally repressed. This serves to draw this material into the unconscious. (iii) The return of the repressed occurs when the repression fails, either partially or completely, which causes the manifestation of symptoms. This begins from the point of fixation which served in the original repression.

According to Freud (1911) psychosis involves a regression to narcissism, whereby the fixation occurs at the narcissistic stage of development. The libido normally develops from autoerotism to heterosexual object choice by travelling via first narcissism and homosexual object choice, and then eventually to heterosexuality. During the mirror stage the ego becomes invested libidinally in the mirror image, this can be viewed as a form of perversion in which the subject takes the mirror image of his own body as the sexual object. Freud (1911) explains that individuals who are manifest homosexuals in later life never emancipated themselves from the binding condition that the object-choice must possess genitals like their own. Freud (1911) names the process by which psychic energy/libido is attached to objects as ‘cathexis’. The
psychic energy is bound to interconnected representations, which is what occurs in fixation. The ego takes itself as an ‘object of cathexis’ in narcissism, there is a cathecting of the libido onto the subjects own ego. This leads to a lack of development of object relationships, and a withdrawal from objects in the surrounding environment.

Freud (1911) explains that, in cases of paranoia the libido is withdrawn from the object. The liberated libido becomes attached to the ego, and is used for aggrandisement of the ego. An example of which can be viewed in the megalomania portrayed by the majority of paranoid patients. A return to the stage of narcissism takes place, in which an individual’s only sexual object is his own libido. Freud (1911) states that paranoiac’s develop a fixation at the stage of narcissism, and asserts, “that the length of the step back from sublimated homosexuality to narcissism is also a measure of the amount of regression characteristic of paranoia” (Freud, 1911, p.72). For example, in the case of Schreber, Freud argues that something caused a regression or "caused the libido to flow backwards” (Freud, 1911, p.62). In the event of paranoia this can be due to general intensification of the libido or deriving from instances of frustration, caused by either a disappointment over a woman or a mishap in social relations with other men. The libido then becomes too powerful to find an outlet along the channels which are already open to it, and subsequently “bursts through its banks at the weakest spot” (Freud, 1911, p.62). Freud states that what lies at the core of the conflict in cases of paranoia, is a homosexual wishful phantasy of loving a man. The transference relationship with Flechsig is what triggers this conflict and resulting symptoms. Freud (1911) explains that Schreber's psychosis is due to an outburst of homosexual libido. According to Freud (1911) Schreber had a repressed passive homosexuality,
and occupied a feminine position in relation to his father. Freud (1911) interprets Schreber’s paranoia as a defence against the outbreak of homosexual libido, “a wishful phantasy round which the illness centred” (Freud, 1911, p.59). Freud (1911) explains that everything becomes indifferent and irrelevant to Schreber as a consequence of withdrawing his libidinal cathexis.

Freud (1911) states that, in paranoia that which is abolished internally in this process of regression, returns as an external perception. What is thought as external reality is really an internal perception (delusion). This can also be illustrated with reference to Schreber’s delusions. In paranoia Freud (1911) argues that the internal feeling, that of a homosexual wishful phantasy of loving a man, is replaced by the delusion. Freud (1911) also interprets Schreber’s case as one related to the father complex, in which the father is the source of interference in the infantile sexual pleasure of the child. The father is viewed as the persecutor and this notion is developed via transference onto the figures of Flechsig and subsequently God himself. Freud (1911) rejects the view that Schreber’s transformation into a woman is simply a means to the end of redeeming the world. He states that, in fact, becoming a woman is the primary delusion and was present from the beginning of the illness and that redeeming the world is the secondary delusion. This primary delusion’s origin can be seen in Schreber's imagining "that really it must be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation" (Freud, 1911, p.13). Freud (1911) states that Schreber originally believed that he was being transformed into a woman for the purpose of sexual abuse by Flechsig. The development of the delusion was that he came to see God as the instigator of the plot to murder his soul and for his body to be “used like a strumpet”. However in these supernatural struggles, initially with Flechsig's soul and then with God, it is Schreber who
is the victor. The sexual delusions of persecution are transformed into religious delusions of
grandeur. Freud (1911) articulates that these features of megalomania and sexual overvaluation
of the ego, found in Schreber's case, are typical in most forms of paranoiac disorder.

Freud (1911) explains that Flechsig, per Schreber, has the same visions and received the
same aural supernatural information that was made available to Schreber, he is a Schreber
counterpart. Schreber is the creator of the delusion and Flechsig used as mirror, as Flechsig is
deemed creator of the conspiracy against him. Freud (1911) states, that in delusion of persecution
there is a relationship between the patient and his persecutor that can be reduced to a simple
formula. The persecutor is someone who is identical to/ a substitute for an individual that played
an equally important part in the patient’s life before the illness began. The intensity of feeling
toward this person is projected outward in the shape of an external power that this persecutor is
deemed to possess. The person now hated and feared as persecutor was once loved and
honoured. Freud (1911) maintains that the main purpose of the persecution asserted by the
patient’s delusion is to justify the change in his emotional attitude. Freud writes that the principal
forms of paranoia are contradictions of the proposition: ”I (a man) love him (a man)” (Freud,
1911, p.63). For example: (i) In delusions of persecution that contradict the verb. “I do not love
him - I hate him because he persecutes me” (Freud, 1911, p.63). (ii) In delusions of erotomania
that contradict the object. “I do not love him - I love her, because she loves me” (Freud, 1911,
p.63). According to Lacan, (1993) in Schreber’s case it is not him he loves but ‘the big him’ that
is God, who loves me as in all cases of erotomania. (iii) In delusions of morbid jealousy that
contradict the subject. “It is not I who loves the man, she loves him” (Freud, 1911, p.64). (iv) In
delusions of megalomania that contradict the whole proposition. “I do not love at all – I do not love anyone” “I love only myself” (Freud, 1911, p.65).

At the height of his delusion Schreber had visions of the impending catastrophe of the end of the world. According to Freud (1911), the end of the world is Schreber’s projection of his internal catastrophe, the death of his subjectivity since he withdrew his love from himself and his subjective world. Schreber’s fear of ‘soul murder’ by Flechsig and the delusion of the newspaper report of his own death also portray his fear of the death of his subjectivity. Schreber set about rebuilding his subjective world so that it is once more liveable. He recreates his subjective world via the construction of his delusion. “The delusional formation from which we take to be the pathological product – is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction” (Freud, 1911, p.71).

4.6.2. Lacan – Psychosis as a Particular Structural Position Brought About by Foreclosure of the Paternal Metaphor

Lacan (1993) explains that for Freud, the point of convergence, of the libidinal dialectic that the mechanism and development of neurosis refer to, is the theme of castration. According to Freud, it is castration that conditions the narcissistic fear. To accept castration, in Freud’s view of the Schreber case, the subject must pay an elevated a price as the reworking of the whole of reality. Lacan (1993) states, that for Schreber, castration is never an issue. Lacan states that the
transformation into a woman is not castration at all. He refers to it as an ‘unmanning’ whereby Freud terms it ‘transformation’.

For Lacan psychosis is a clinical structure, founded by the mechanism or operation of ‘foreclosure’. According to Lacan, where the name of the father is foreclosed, psychosis emerges as a clinical structure. Foreclosure is the defining structural mechanism of psychosis, in which ‘the Name-Of –The Father’ is foreclosed and thus a hole in the Symbolic Order is created. In foreclosure the ‘Name of the Father’ (the signifier) is not integrated into the symbolic order of the psychotic subject. The consequence of its non integration results in a hole in the symbolic, which results in an inability to assimilate or metaphorise the desire of the mother as named by the paternal function. Therefore, while the neurotic experiences a return of the repressed, it is possible for the psychotic to encounter a return of the object in the real. For the psychotic the unconscious is present but does not operate correctly. Lacan (1955-1956) explains that the imaginary covers the gap in the symbolic order of the psychotic. This is what lends psychosis its form in terms of psychotic phenomena, such as delusions, auditory or visual hallucinations, intrusions of the body and bodily symptoms (Butler-Rees and Ball, 2011).

Lacan depicts a useful contrast between Schreber's delusion of feminization and pregnancy, and the comparable hysterical situation in an individual with symptoms signifying their unconscious fantasies of the same ideas. That which emerges as ‘real’ for the psychotic has not undergone symbolization (Leavy, 1996). The hysterical individual’s symptoms speak the unconscious language, they are signifiers. It is among these signifiers that the significance of neurotic symptoms can be discovered. What occurs in the psychotic delusion is not signification,
but the ‘inmixing’ of subjects. Here Lacan introduces the concept of intersubjectivity. The psychotic encounters as his own subjectivity, his self or his being, the self or being of the Other, not as a signifier (as it would be in the case of empathic intersubjectivity in the neurotic) but as an external reality (Leavy, 1996).

Lacan (1993) states that in order for a psychotic break to occur two conditions are necessary. Firstly, a psychotic structure and secondly, the ‘name of the father’ must be called upon or called into symbolic opposition to the subject. Specifically, the function of the father must be called upon in terms of the subject where there is no possibility of him signifying this call. It is a question of the subject’s impossibility of the access to a signifier (Lacan, 1993). The absence of the signifier, ‘the Name of the Father’, is revealed to Schreber when there is a call for symbolic recognition. For example, his promotion to the highest court in the land. When Schreber is nominated president of the appeal court, he no longer has a superior. The paternal agency disappears as he now occupies the supreme place. The role of judge also represents the paternal symbolic role as law maker and mediator. Schreber was also the youngest to ever be nominated for such a position, which went against the order of things and contributed to his psychotic break. Lacan (1993) states, that ultimately the question here is whether or not the subject will become a father. It is a question of paternity. In psychosis, the signifier / the paternal metaphor, has been foreclosed. There has been no intervention at the level of the symbolic in the mother-child dyad, and therefore the subject remains identified with the mother's lack. When there is a call for symbolic recognition all that appears is a gap in the ‘Other’.
Lacan (1993) interprets Schreber's concept of ‘soul murder’ as representing the feeling that a dreadful grievance had been committed against him. Lacan explains that when Schreber sees his obituary in the newspaper and believes that the world is ending, he experiences the death of his subjectivity and descends into a near catatonic state. He experiences the entire world, including himself, as being without meaning. Melman (2009) attributes Schreber’s world’s loss of meaning to his, ‘lack of lack’. He explains that castration lends the symbolic dimension to language, and that every signifier is the symbol of a lack; whereby the signifier represents the subject’s lack of desire being satisfied. The meaning of language is established by the lack of the object of desire. In the psychotic subject castration is foreclosed, therefore there is no lacking object. The world’s loss of meaning is due to the psychotic’s lack of the lack that causes desire. There is no paternal metaphor to which to refer himself, therefore he loses his subjective domicile in the locus of that lack, the big other (Melman, 2009).

Lacan (1993) states that, Schreber’s recovery began when he accepted his ‘unmanning’ as an essential sacrifice to redeem the world. Where previously there was indignant rejection there was now the solution wherein he would be the wife of God. In this compromise it is God who is limited and ineffectual and the new breed of spiritual humanity will come from Schreber's womb. Melman (2009) describes this taking up of a feminine position as being a consequence of the psychosis. He explains that psychosis excludes the psychotic subject from the field of reality and exiles him to another place, the locus in which femininity is sustained. This ‘push towards the woman’ is proper to every psychosis. Melman (2009) explains that Schreber’s dressing in front of the mirror and his notion of the act as respecting the order of the world, was in fact
Schreber respecting his own psychosis. He illustrates that this act allows Schreber to find a home in the other which leads to his ‘cure’. The delusion or delusional metaphor of the psychotic introduces a type of point ‘de caption’, a ‘sinthome’ in which the sliding of signification can have some respite, and is stabilized (Lacan, 1993).

In criticism of Freud, Lacan (1993) argues that there isn’t anything in Schreber’s delusion that allows for the assumption of a genital maturity that would explain a fear of castration. He states that the homosexual tendency is far from revealing itself as being the most crucial element in the case. Lacan (1993) explains that psychosomatic phenomena are at the heart of the psychotic relation. Lacan (1993) clarifies that somatic phenomena in psychosis are radically different to those in neurosis. For example, when the hysteric converts affect into somatic symptoms, the symptom still retains a trace of the repressed idea associated with it. The neurotic symptom can be decoded, as it is in part symbolically represented. In psychosis however, there is no such symbolisation, there is a direct relation without mediation. The psychotic symptom appears without any dialectic, without any interpretation possible to demonstrate any symbolically decipherable relation with the subject’s history, and that can be interpreted as such for the subject.

Lacan (1993) also criticises Freud in stating that the father figure is so powerful in Schreber’s delusion that it cannot be solely explained as an imaginary, narcissistic regression. Lacan states that in the pre-Oedipal dynamic of the imaginary triad of mother, child and imaginary phallus, the phallic mother is not homogenous or of the same order as with the
castration complex. Therefore, according to Lacan (1993), Freud’s attempt to situate the psychosis in relation to castration fails. Castration of the subject for Lacan is not of the imaginary order but pertains to a symbolic lack of the imaginary phallus and represents the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. It is a symbolic, and not an imaginary act. The psychotic subject completely forecloses symbolic castration which leads to a return in the ‘real’ of castration in the form of hallucinations of bodily dismemberment, dissolutions or self-mutilation etc. Lacan states that it is only possible to refer to castration, which is integral to Oedipus complex, if another element is recognised. This element is the ‘Name of the Father’, which is a signifying element that cannot be reduced by any imaginary conditioning. The ‘Name of the Father’ is present whenever something of the Symbolic Order is perceived.
5: Conclusion

To conclude, the main points made above in relation to the symptom will be summarised. Lacan emphasised the Freudian originality of the experience of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. Lacan maintains that the unconscious is structured like a language and constituted from repressed signifiers which are repressed in a particular relation to other signifiers in a signifying chain. The unconscious continually produces repressed signifiers that reveal themselves in the form of symptoms. Symptoms are compromise-formations resulting from the antagonism between the subject’s conscious intentions and what has been repressed. The repressed memories take the form of a compromise formation, so as to be admitted to consciousness when they return in symptoms, in dreams and, more generally, in all products of the unconscious.

In psychosis the paternal metaphor is foreclosed, that is, not integrated into the symbolic order of the subject and this causes a hole in the symbolic. Therefore while the neurotic experiences a return of the repressed, it is possible for the psychotic to encounter a return of the object in the real. For the psychotic subject the unconscious is present but does not operate in the same manner as in psychosis. The imaginary covers the gap in the symbolic order of the psychotic subject, and this is what lends psychosis its form in terms of psychotic phenomena. In psychosis, the sinthome takes the place of the Oedipus complex, in tying the three dimensions of the Borromean knot together with a kind of ‘nonstandard knot’, and prevents the imaginary from becoming completely detached from the real.
For Lacan (1975) the function of the sinthome for the psychotic patient serves to hold together the three rings of the borromean knot, the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. It operates as a fourth term that holds the three dimensions in place. The distinction between a neurotic symptom and a psychotic sinthome is significant, as it determines the manner in which the symptom is interpreted and also directs the treatment. Lacan (1957-1958) explains, that in contrast to the neurotic symptom, if the analyst were to attempt to unravel the psychotics sinthome it could be harmful to the patient. Fink (2007) illustrates that this could lead to the formation of a gaping hole in the symbolic that could trigger a psychotic break. Even though such a break might potentially lead to the formation of a delusion that must be part of the curative process, it could also potentially make matters worse and is therefore safer to avoid.

When the neurotic’s jouissance-providing symptom is no longer functioning and has been jeopardised the subject seeks therapy to be relieved, not of the symptom but of its recent inadequacy so that their satisfaction can be restored to its previous level, and in its place the therapist offers an alternative substitute satisfaction. When the psychotic’s sinthome begins to come untied, the goal of the analyst is to aid the analysand either in the discovery of a means to return to the previous stability, or to find a new situation that will lead to the formation of either the same or a different type of stability.
Chapter 6: References


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Chapter 7: Appendices

7.2. Appendix B: The Borromean Knot (Lacan, 2005)
7.3. Appendix C: Schema R (Lacan, 2006b, p.462)