Seminar 9: Wednesday 12 March 1974

[Dr. Lacan arranges four sketches on the board].

Good, so then I am entering into the core of the subject, even though I would of course prefer to talk about something else. To say for example that... that I have no reason to complain, that... that I am giving, in a word, at the same time, I am giving you - I apologise - I am giving you hay to eat. All of that is hay. These are things that cross over one another, and, well, which do not get across. So that I have no reason to complain in this sense that, it is either one thing or the other: either I am given back my hay right away, this is what (134) happens, like that, my hay as such, in short, it is not at all something that cannot be tolerated, it is served up to me again just as, just as I have propounded it. This is what happens with some people. And then there are people, for example that this hay tickles so much as
it goes down their throat, that they vomit Claudel, at me, for example. It is because they already had him there… I am annoyed, I am annoyed because the person that I made vomit Claudel telephoned — Gloria naturally — at the moment… to ask her where my seminar was held. Anyway, I am terribly sorry, I hope that she has ended up by finding out. She is perhaps here, in any case if she is not here let her be brought my apologies, because Gloria sent her packing, and it is not at all what… what I would have wanted: why would she not come to eat hay like everyone else… Good, good, well then the hay in question, anyway, is what you know is on the agenda, is that not so, because of me: the Borromean knot.

I can say that I am spoiled, because I have just been brought an African one. It is the Borromean knot in person is it not. It is... I certify its authenticity for you, because ever since I have been handling it, I have begun to know a bit about it… and I like it a lot, because if there is one thing about which I rack my brain — I even asked about it, anyway, it is... it is to know where it comes from. It is called Borromean, it is not at all because there was a chap who one day discovered it. It was of course discovered a long time ago, and what astonishes me is that, is that it has not been used more, indeed, because it was truly, it was truly a way of tackling what I call the three dimensions. They were taken up differently and there must be reasons for that. There must be reasons for that, because I cannot at all see why — anyway, I do not see this at a first approach — I do not see why people would not have tried to squeeze the point, to make the point, if you wish, with it, rather than with things that cut themselves. It is a fact that it did not happen like that. What fate it would have had if it had happened like that, it is probable that this would have trained us quite differently.

It is not at all that those who are called philosophers, namely, good God, those who try to say something about our… our condition, in a word, to respond to it, it is not at all the case that there is no trace of
the fact that this business of knots, precisely, did not interest them, because: for truly, for truly a very long period of time there have been (135) people who find themselves curiously having, as far as we know – by being classed for a long time as far as we know, among the women, anyway, what I call ‘the women’ – and it is in the plural since as you know, in fact, there have been some of them there for a long time – that women reached an understanding of that, by making tissues, fabrics. And this might have put people on the track. It is very curious that quite the contrary, this rather inspired intimidation.

Aristotle indeed talks about it, and it is very curious that he did not take it as an object. Because that would have been a start that would not have been any worse than any other. What is it, what is it that ensures that knots, knots, are so poorly imagined? This one like that, because it is made in a certain way, holds up. [Lacan is talking here about the African knot in his hand]. But it is only when it is flattened out that it is not easy to handle, and it is probably not for nothing indeed, that with these knots it is always things which make a fabric, namely, that form a surface, that people tried to fabricate. It is probably because the flattened out thing, the surface, is very much linked, in fact, to all sorts of uses. Yes. I am going to give you right away a proof of the fact that knots are poorly imagined. Good.

You make a plait. A plait of two. You do not have to do very much with it, it is enough for you to cross over once, then a second time, after two you find your two in order. Knot them now end to end, namely, the same with the same. Well then it is knotted. One could even say it is knotted twice. That makes a double buckle. It holds together, the... what you have joined together, namely, as my faithful Achates put as a title of my last seminar of last year, he called that strings of string (les ronds de ficelle). I don’t know whether in the text I had called it that or something else, it is probable that I had called it that, but he put it into the title. Good.
Good. Now make a plait of three. Before you rediscover, in the plait of three, the three strands — let us call them strands (des brins), today, for example — the three strands in order, you have to perform 6 times the gesture of crossing over the strands, as a result of which, after you have performed this gesture 6 times, you rediscover the three strands in order. And then again you join them. Well then, it is all the same something that is not self-evident, that is not immediately imagined: the fact is if once this knot that I quite simply told you was a

(136) Borromean knot, namely, such as it is in the most simple form, the one there on the left, it is not self-evident that having plaited as in the first case, you can see when all is said and done that this stems from a double knot, it is not self-evident that it is enough for you to break one of these strands for the two others to be free. Because at first sight, they seem to be very well twisted around one another, and one might presume that they hold together just as well as in the plait of two. Well then not at all: you see right away that they separate. It is enough to cut one of the three for the two others to prove not to be knotted. And this remains true no matter what the multiple of six with which you pursue the plait. It is quite certain in effect that, since you have found your three strands in order at the end of six gestures of plaiting, you are also going to find them in order when you make a further six. When you make a further six of them this will give you this Borromean knot here [sketch 3]. Namely, that what you see here passing once, inside the two other knots, which you can see are — and that is why I presented them like that — free from one another, you do that, in reality here you see it, twice. And it is still a knot described as Borromean, in that whatever may be the one that you break, the two others will be free. With a tiny little bit of imagination, you can see why. It is because, let us take these two here for example, they are such that, let us say to say things simply, that they do not cut one another, that they are one above the other. You can note that this is true for each couple of two. Good. Here are two ways of making a Borromean knot, but which in reality are only one, namely, that to
plait them an indefinite number of times multiple of six, it will still be just as authentic a Borromean knot.

Fig. IX-2

(137) I apologise to those that this may weary, what I am telling you here all the same has an end. I would like simply to point out to you that the count is not complete for all that. You can plait for as long as you like, provided you stick to a multiple of six, as long as you like, the plait in question will always be a Borromean knot. Already just by itself, this seems to open the door to an infinity of Borromean knots.

Well then this infinity, already realised virtually since you can conceive of it, this infinity is not limited to this. Such and such an example of it that I give you on the board in the shape of this way (one cannot say that the instruments are suitable, good...) in the shape of this way of inscribing it, namely, that you see that here [sketch 2], the buckle, as I might say, is double, and that if the Borromean knot is realised in a way that I had first traced out in such a way that it can be clearly seen, by pulling from here that this makes two. You can for that matter draw it by making come back here the buckle which you see has passed under one of the levels of my rings of string, and for each of the two to come back, it will do the circuit, of one of these rings, and will come back here to inscribe itself by crossing underneath the two buckles that are found here to be parallel because of the arrangement, and to give the shape in short of a cross. If you arrange the Borromean knot in this way – I hope I was... I made you imagine what this drawing could be, if you want me to trace it out.
will trace it out for you – it becomes entirely symmetrical, and it has the interest of presentifying for us in a different form the materialisation that it can give in this shape of symmetry, precisely (the symmetry, in two words, is it not: the symmetry from another side). Namely, to show us that there is a way of presenting the Borromean knot which, in its very tracing out, imposes on us the emergence of symmetry, namely, of the two.

\[ \text{Fig. IX-3} \]

(138) There was no need for us to go so far to notice it. Namely, that by simply, I would say 'pulling' on this part of the ring of string, you can easily imagine for yourself the result that it will give, namely, to fold in two this ring on the right [sketch 1]. Namely, to obtain this result which is presented as follows:

\[ \text{Fig. IX-4} \]

As a result of which, you see that what results from it is the following: namely, that one of these rings pulls the knot folded in two, the buckle folded in two in this direction → while the other that you have there is presented in a manifest way, perhaps moreover less salient to
your eyes, the particular thing which ensures that, you cannot unknot these knots of three but it is enough for one of them, any one at all of them to be missing for the two others to be free. It is even one of the clearest ways to image the fact that you can, if you pass your ring inside the knot that I am calling... of the buckle that I am calling ‘the folded buckle’, if you put through another buckle folded in the same way pass, you can knot an indefinite number of these rings of string, and it is enough for one to be broken, for one to be lacking, for one to be missing, for all the others to be free. As a result of which, as a result of which, what cannot but come to mind, is that, since you have added an indefinite number of times, they are folded knots taken up one into the other, you are not forced to end because you see here functioning, namely, a simple ring of string. You can buckle this complete circle in a way that makes... the thing to be closed by a folded circle. Namely, that if you had more than three of them, it would be quite easy for you to imagine that to close, it is with one of (139) these folded circles that you would bring about the closure. If you bring about the closure with three, what you obtain is in fact very precisely this result [sketch 2]. Namely, that starting from there you can produce this buckle, namely, that from the handling in three’s of the Borromean knot – which as you see can function on a much greater number, from the handling in three’s you give rise to this figure of which I told you that it presentified the symmetry in the Borromean knot itself. Namely, that it inscribes the two in it.

What must be underlined, before closing what we might call this ‘depicted’ demonstration, that we can describe as depicted, what should be underlined is the following. It is that to each of these rings of string – to call them such in the way that gives the best image – to each of these rings of string, you can give, by a sufficiently regular

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manipulation (you must not be surprised at the patience you will require) to each of these three, namely, as much to this ring of string here as to this ring of string there also, you can give exactly the same place which is the one that you see depicted here as the third.

What use do I make of this Borromean knot of three? It is of use to me, as I might say for inventing the rule of a game, in such a way that there can be figured by it the relationship of the Real very properly to what is involved in the Imaginary and the Symbolic. Namely, that the Real, like the Imaginary and the Symbolic, is what makes three of it. That makes three of it, and nothing more.

It is striking that up to now there is no example that there was ever a saying that posited the Real, not as that which is third, because that would be to say too much, but as that which, with the Imaginary and the Symbolic, makes three. That is not all... 'with the Imaginary and the Symbolic makes three'... that is not all! By this presentation what (140) I am trying to hook onto, is a structure such that the Real, by defining it in this way, in other words the Real of before the order, that nodality gives us this something which, by saying that it is before order in no way supposes a first, a second, a third. And as I have just underlined for you, not even a middle with two extremes. For even in the first form of the Borromean knot, the one that I... that I showed you allows there to be depicted as middle term knotting two extremes, this folded circle, that I am showing you here, even in this case any one at all of the three circles can play this role. Namely, that it is in

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![Fig. IX-6](http://www.lacaninireland.com)
no way linked, except to make you imagine it, the figure on the left
only being there in order to make accessible to you the fact, is that not
so that there is a middle in the folded circle; but any one at all of the
two others can fulfil the same function, the others then taking the
position of extremes.

Where does this get us?

It is to be noted that if we interest ourselves in the ‘two’ – which is
indeed the problem presented by something which is truly, one can
say, insistent in what the experience of the analytic discourse brings
us, it is not for nothing that it introduces this two par excellence which
is the love of one’s own image, it is indeed the essence of symmetry
itself; does this not introduce us, because of this knot, to this
consideration that the Imaginary is not what is to be most
recommended for finding the rule of the game of love. What
experience tells us about it, if it is specifically marked by imaginary
representation, since we have come, from the experience itself, to
impose it on ourselves, we imagine that love is two. Is it all that
(141) proved, other than by imaginary experience? Why would it not
be this middle – as moreover is indicated by the fact that it is at the
level of this middle that there is produced, this time, two times two,
why should it not be this middle – which I have just underlined for
you is moreover gyroaving (gyroavag) namely, vagabond, that it can
just as well be fulfilled by any one of the three – why would it not be
this middle which, by providing itself in a suspect way with this form,
with this form of the image of itself – this middle which would deliver
correctly thought out, namely, through the Real of these connections,
the mainspring of these knots?

In other words, is the Borromean knot not the mode in which there is
delivered to us the One of the ring of string as such, the fact on the
other hand that there are three of these Ones, and that it is by being
knotted, only by being knotted, that we get the two. There are many
considerations into which I could stray, as I might say, because they would not yet circumscribe any more closely what I might call the first character of the three.

It is first, not in the sense that it would be the first to be first, because as everyone knows there is another which is described as such, but if the two is so described, it is in a quite singular way, since it is not in any way said, that one can accede to it starting from the One. If only because of the fact that — as has been noted for a long time — to say that one and one gives two, comes from the simple fact of the mark of addition, supposedly a reunion, namely, already the two.

In this sense the two is as one might say something of a vicious order, since it reposes only on its own supposition. To join by one plus two one is already to install the two. (It was back to last - it is an imaginary thing)

But for the moment let us stick simply to the following, which is that what the Borromean knot illustrates for us, is that the two is only produced from the junction of the one to the three. Or more exactly, let us say that if one says that — as has been humorously done, that ‘the number two rejoices at being odd’, it is certainly not without reason that it rejoices — it would be wrong to rejoice at being odd, because if it were to rejoice for that reason, it would be a pity for it, it certainly is not so, but that it is engendered by the two odds one and three, is in short what the Borromean knot brings out for us, as I might say.

You should all the same clearly sense the relationship that this (142) lucubration has with our analytic experience. Freud is certainly a genius. He is a genius in that what analytic discourse brought out by his pen, is what I will call primitive terms (des termes sauvages). Read Group psychology and the analysis of the ego and very specifically the chapter on Identification, to grasp the quality of genius there is in the distinction that he formulates between three sorts of identification, namely, those that I denoted, when I highlighted them.
by the unary trait, by the Einziger Zug, and the way in which he distinguishes them from love in so far as carried to a term which, undoubtedly, is indeed the one that we must reach, namely, this function of the Other, in so far as it is given by the Father, and on the other hand, the other form, that of the identification described as hysterical, namely, from desire to desire, in so far as he distinguishes all three forms of this identification.

That presented in this way, it is only a knot of riddles, I will say: a further reason to work, namely, to try to give to this a shape that involves a more rigorous algorithm. This algorithm is precisely the one that I am trying to give in the three itself, in so far as this three, as such, makes a knot. This is obviously the reason, as I might say, the reason to work. But a reason which, as I might say does not fail to damage us, not because the rings of string is already a toric, or indeed a twisted figure, it is much more still from this very singular fact even mathematics has not yet managed to find the algorithm, the most simple algorithm, namely, the one that would allow us, in the presence, certainly of other forms of knots than that of the Borromean knot, to find this something that would deliver to us for the knots in so far as they involve more than one ring of string – because for a single ring of string, being knotted to itself, it has, this algorithm, I could easily, I already did it, put on the board for you the figure of something which would have more or less the same aspect as the central figure, and which would nevertheless only be a single ring of string (I say ‘more or less’ because obviously it would not be the same – for a single ring of string, it may know what is homomorphous; for several rings of string the algorithm has not been found. This is not nevertheless a reason to abandon a task which engages nothing other than this two which is what is most involved in this figure of love as I have just reminded you.

(143) Love – I hope that already you feel more at ease – love is thrilling (passionant). To say that, is to say simply the truth of
experience, but to say it like that, seems to be nothing, but is all the same it is all the same to take a step. Because, for whoever has his ears a little open, it is not at all the same thing as to say that it is a "passion." First of all there are many cases where love is not a passion. I would even say more. I doubt whether it is ever a passion. I doubt it, my God, because of my experience. Because of my experience – it does not stem only from mine – I mean that my experience in the analytic discourse gives me enough material – for what? For me to be able to allow myself in short to do what I defined the last time as knowledge, namely, to invent it. Which in no way protects you, especially if you are in analysis with me, from supposing that I have this knowledge, as something that I am not supposed to invent. But if knowledge, even unconscious, is precisely what is invented to supply for something which is only perhaps the mystery of the two, one can see that there is all the same a step taken, in daring to say that if love is thrilling, it is not because it is passive. It is a saying which, as such, implies in itself a rule. Since to say that something is thrilling, well, is to speak about it, as a game, where one is only in short active starting from rules.

There are all the same some people who have noticed that for a long time. As regards everything that is said, there is someone called Wittgenstein, in particular, who distinguished himself at that.

So then, what I am putting forward, is that my formula there, 'love is thrilling', if I put it forward, it is as strictly true. Yes. Strictly true: it is all the same a long time since I since I emitted some reservations about this, namely, that strictly true is never more than half-true, that one can only ever half-say the truth. We will all the same have to manage, have to manage before the end of the year to formulate what that involves, and that I explain it for you later. It is the true – there is here all the same something that analytic experience can put us in contact with – yeah... the true has no other way of being able to be defined than that which in short brings it about that the body goes
towards enjoyment, and that in this, what it is forced by, is nothing other than the principle, the principle by which sex is very specifically linked to the death of the body. It is only among sexed beings that the body dies. And this forcing of reproduction, is indeed where the little bit of the true that we can state is of use.

I will even say more. Since it is death that is at stake – that is even why we never have more than the verisimilitude, since this death, the principle of the true, this death in the speaking being in so far as he speaks, is never anything more than a sham – death, truly, even though it confronts us, is not within reach of the true. Death pushes it. Even though it confronts us, even though we have to deal with death, it only happens with the Beautiful, and there it keeps its rendezvous.

I already demonstrated that at a time, at the time when I was doing the Ethics of psychoanalysis, and why does that keep its rendezvous? Because things being in a certain rotating order, it keeps its rendezvous in so far as it glorifies the body. There the principle of enjoyment, which is forced, is the fact of death, and everyone knows...that it is "in the name of the body" that all of that happens, this indeed is what I formerly illustrated by the tragedy of Antigone and which curiously passed into Christian myth – because I do not know whether you have clearly perceived why there took place, this whole story this story of Christ who speaks of nothing but enjoyment: the lilies of the fields which neither weave nor sow – who traverses, for part, the myth affirms, traverses death. All of that when all is said and done has no goal, what we see, in a word, being spread out over kilometres of canvas, has no end than the production of glorious bodies about which one may ask what they are going to do throughout eternity, even if they are put in a ring in a circle of a theatre, what indeed they are going to be able to in contemplating something or other. It is all the same curious that it is along this path, this path not of the true, but of the Beautiful, that it is along this path that there was manifested for the first time the dogma of the divine Trinity. It must
be said that it is a mystery! It is a mystery that... which has been approached, but, but not without a certain number of slippages. If in Aristotle’s logic, the other day, I demonstrated for you the irruption of, of some theories or other of love – of some theories or other of love where there are very clearly distinguished love and enjoyment, this is already not bad, huh?

It is already not bad, but that only gives two, it does not at all give a trinity. But what is amusing to read in a treatise On the Trinity by a certain Richard de Saint Victor, the same unbelievable irruption, in fact, of the return of, of the return of love, of the Holy Spirit (145) considered as 'a little friend'. It is something that I would ask you to go to see in the text, in fact – I will get it out for you one day, I did not bring it along here this morning because, because I have enough to say today, but it is worthwhile, it is worthwhile touching that. How is it that it is by the Beautiful, that something which is there... the very truth, and what is more, what is true in the Real, namely, what I am trying to, to articulate this morning, like that, limping along: it is all the same quite curious. Yes.

In what way are the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real something which at least have the pretension, in short of going a little further than... than this going round in a circle of enjoyment, of the body and of death. Is there here something from which we might reach, reach better than what only... that what only appears to us as a signal, as a trace, I have just spoken of the True, of the Beautiful, in a way which in a word makes them function for us as middles (moyens) – I must deal with what is involved, what is involved in the Good.

In this business of the Borromean knot can the Good be situated somewhere? I tell you right away, there is very little chance, huh: if the True and the Beautiful did not hold up, I do not see how the Good would do any better. The only virtue that... that I see coming out of this questioning – and I am indicating it to you here while, while there...
is time, because it will no longer be seen – the only virtue, if... if there is no sexual relationship, as I state, is shame (pudeur). There you are, this indeed is why I... I think it was a stroke of genius by the person who put a certain atterrita on the cover of my Télévision. It is a... it forms part of a theme in which the central personage, the one who gives its meaning to the whole picture, is, is a demon, in a word, who... was perfectly well recognised by the Ancients as being the demon of shame. He is not particularly funny, that is even why that the person, the atterrita, opens her arms in a kind of panic. Yes.

So then, the non-dupes err, is perhaps the unashamed (non-pudes) err. Which as a result is promising, huh, it is promising because since on the other hand I think that, in fact, we should expect nothing, absolutely no progress from anything... I said that like that, to someone who spat out this hay, very kindly, because it is a person who spat out, truly, strictly only the hay that I had put into his mouth. It is no worse than anything else. It is... it is my hay, is it not... So (146) then, this does not all the same mean that there are not things that change. I am in the process of questioning love. And I begin to read things, like that, which are a little approach, simply, I do not know how it can happen... I will perhaps say more about it... if the result of an extension of the psychoanalytic discourse, since after all I am doing no less than considering it, but as a canker! I mean that it can explode, a lot of things, if being well spoken is only governed by shame, well then, obligatorily, it shocks. It shocks but it does not violate shame...

So then let us try to question ourselves about what might happen if one made serious ground from the angle that... love is thrilling, but that this implies that one follows the rule of the game in it. Naturally, for that, it must be known. That is perhaps what is lacking: it is that people have always been here in the most profound ignorance, namely, that they play a game whose rules they do not know. So then
if this knowledge must be invented in order for there to be knowledge, it is perhaps for that that analytic discourse may be of use.

Only if it is true that what you win on the one hand you lose on the other, there is surely something that is going to suffer. It is not hard to find: what is going to suffer is enjoyment. Because, in short, enjoyment is not lacking to this thing that is pursued blindly under the name of love! It is there by the shovelful! What is marvellous is that nothing is known about it: but it is probably what is proper to enjoyment, precisely, that nothing can ever be known about it... What is all the same surprising, is that, that there has not been a discourse on enjoyment. People have spoken about whatever you want, about extended substance, about thinking substance, but the first idea which might come, namely, that if there is something by which the body can be defined, it is not life, since we only see life in bodies which are, after all, what? Things of the order of bacteria, of things which flourish like that, in fact, you quickly get three kilos when you start with a milligram... the fact is ... it is not easy to see what relationship there is between that and our body... But that the very definition of a body is that it is an enjoying substance, how is it that this has never yet been stated by anyone? It is the only thing outside a myth which is really accessible to experience. A body enjoys itself, it enjoys itself (147) well or badly, but it is clear that this enjoyment introduces it into a dialectic in which incontestably there must be other terms for it to hold up, namely, nothing less than this knot which I, which I am serving up to you in a sandwich.

That enjoyment may suffer when love becomes something a little civilised, namely, when people know that it is to be played as a game - in fact it is not sure that this will happen. It is not sure that it will happen, but it might all the same occur to you, as I might say. It might occur to you all the more in that there are little traces, like that. There is all the same a remark that I would really like to make to you, concerning the pertinence of this knot: it is that in love, what bodies
tend towards – and there is something piquant that I am going to say to you afterwards – what bodies tend towards, is to knot themselves together. They do not manage to do so, naturally, because...you clearly see...what is extraordinary is that a body never manages to be knotted. There is not even a trace of a knot in the body! If there is something that struck me when I was doing anatomy it was indeed that: I was always expecting to see at least, like that, in a corner, an artery, or a nerve, which...which hoopla, would do that... Nothing! I never saw anything like it, and that is even why anatomy, I should tell you thrilled me (*m'a passioné*) for two years. That really pisses off people who do their medicine as forced labour, like that. Not me. Naturally, I did not notice right away, that that was why it thrilled me, I noticed it afterwards; you never know until afterwards. And it is absolutely certain that what I was looking for in dissecting, was to find a knot. Yeah.

Which is why this Borromean knot rejoins all the same the why of the fact that, that love, in fact, is not designed to be tackled by the Imaginary. Because the simple fact that when it is working out badly, is that not so, for want of knowing the rule of the game, it articulates the knots of love, huh... It is funny all the same that this remains as a metaphor, that it does not illuminate things, that it does not give the idea that, on the side of this thing whose strange consistency I have, I hope, like that, made you sense a little, and the fact that... that it is surprising in fact that the Real, when all is said and done, is only that, a matter of knots; in short all the rest can be dreamt about. God knows, the dream in fact has a place in the activity of the speaking being.

I am letting myself go a little bit, like that, like that by putting in parentheses – you will pardon me, because you usually pardon me – but it is all the same, it is all the same unbelievable that the power of the dream should have gone so far as to make a desire out of a corporal function, sleep. No one has yet, has ever highlighted that
something which is a rhythm – well, manifestly, because it exists among many other beings than speaking beings - the speaking being manages to make into a desire. He manages to pursue his dream as such, and because of that, to desire not to wake up. Naturally there is a moment where it lets go. But that Freud should have been able to go that far is something whose autonomy, originality, no one has really highlighted. Good.

So let us come back to our metaphorical knots. Do you not sense that what I am trying to do, by having recourse to them, is to do something which would not involve any supposition. Because people have spend their time positing, but never being able to posit except by supposing. Namely, that people posited the body – that was required – and people supposed the soul in it. It would be all the same necessary - this is a thing, there, like that, that I brewed up, because of the level I was at in this Télévision, huh, to speak about the soul and the unconscious... the unconscious, might be something quite different to a ‘supposed’, since knowledge (if what I advanced about it the last time is true), it is not at all required, it is not at all required to suppose it: it is a knowledge in the course of construction.

If it happened, if it happened that love were to become a game whose... whose rules one knew, this would perhaps, have many disadvantages with regard to enjoyment. But this would reject it, as I might say, towards its conjoined term. And if this conjoined term is indeed what I am putting forward about the Real, for which, as you see, I am satisfied with this slender little support of the number (I did not say the figure (chiffre)), of the number three. If love, becoming a game of which one knows the rules, were to be found one day, since that it its function, at the end of the fact that it is one of the One’s of these threes – if it functioned to conjoin the enjoymt of the Real with the Real of enjoyment, would that not be something to make the game worthwhile?
The enjoyment of the Real has a meaning, huh. If there is somewhere an enjoyment of the Real as such, and if the Real is what I am saying, namely, to begin with the number three – and you know that it is not to the three that I hold huh: adding 1416 to it would still give the same (149) number, huh, for what I use it for, and you could also write 2718, it is a particular Napierian logarithm, that plays the same role – the only people who enjoy this Real, are the mathematicians. So then it would be necessary for the mathematicians to pass under the yoke of the game of love, that they should state something about it to us, that they should do a little more work on the Borromean knot – because I should admit to you, in fact, I am really embarrassed, more than you can believe; I spend my days making Borromean knots, while it is... there, like that, I knit.

Only there you are, the enjoyment of the Real does not work without the Real of enjoyment. Because for one to be knotted to the other, the other must be knotted to the one. And the Real of enjoyment, is stated. But what meaning can be given to this term: the Real of enjoyment?

This is where I am leaving you for today, with a question mark.
Seminar 10: Tuesday 19 March 1974

Whatever I may say – I say ‘I’, in quotes, because I sup-pose myself in this saying (ce dire), of which nevertheless there is the fact that it is in my voice – whatever I may say is going to give rise to two aspects: a good and a bad. This is precisely because people attribute it to me wanting the Imaginary to be excrement, muck, a bad thing, and that what is supposed to be good is the Symbolic. Here I am again then formulating an ethics. It is the misunderstanding of this that I want to dissipate because this year I am taking you forward from this structure of the knot, in which I put the emphasis on the following: that it is from the three that the Real is introduced into it.

All of this does not prevent this knot itself is singular, if what I put forward the last time is true (inform yourselves among mathematicians), namely, that this so simple knot, this knot of three, the algorithm, namely, what would allow there to be brought to it what the Symbolic culminates in, namely, the demonstration, the articulation in terms of truth, if we are reduced to affirming our failure with regard to this algorithm, our failure to establish it, to handle it. Hence the result that at least until further notice, these knots – these knots whose writing I was able to produce, I did it for you the last time, in more than one form – you are reduced, on the basis of this writing, to imagine it in space. It has even got to the point that if what I can make in the simplest form, these projected knots as I am going to show you, stem from the fact that here what I am drawing for you, is

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something that you can imagine. Namely, how this third buckle, by
(152) establishing itself from a trajectory [that of?] these two
independent knots, as you see, namely, imagine from these two
independent knots, made by this triple knot, that I call the Borromean
knot, this thing which thus represented can be imagined by you in
space, you can see, just as well as any other way in which I might
have written this knot – you can note that it also is a writing: namely,
that by effacing one, I can calculate that the two others are free. I
mean any one whatsoever. That what constitutes the Imaginary, in the
way in which you can sense here that in the space they are held, that
this itself is writing, because it is enough for you to efface one of them
to be able to spot that the two others are free, on the simple condition
that they cut one another in a particular way which for its part is
nameable from the following: namely, that the above and the below
form two couples, two matching couples from the fact that the two
above follow one another, and that the two beneath are not on the
same line. I mean that they succeed one another with respect to the
two above, that there is a trick (tour) which means that, to demonstrate
that two of these circles are free, it is enough that there should be two
above which follow one another, then two below which come
afterwards – I said: on the same line – I probably made an error earlier
in saying that they are not on the same line. That was a slip.

Fig. X-1
The enigma of writing, of writing \textit{qua} flattened out, is there: it is that moreover, by tracing out what is essentially of the order of the imaginable, namely, this projection into space, it is still a writing that I (153) am producing, namely, what can be stated, stated from the simplest algorithm here, namely, a succession.

This squeezing, namely, that by imagining it, you rediscover the idea of the norm, that the norm is imaginable once there is the support of an image, and that here we are always led to privilege one of them, an imagination of what makes a good shape; a curious relapse, why is the shape described as `good'? Because after all why should it not have been called simply what it is, namely, beautiful? We slip again with the ancient \textit{katos kagathos} into this ambiguity, which for its part, proves at this date, at the date when that was how the Greeks expressed themselves, and that when all is said and done, we still find the title of nobility, the antiquity of the family, which, as you know, can always be found by the genealogist, for any imbecile whatsoever and also then for any imbecility whatsoever.

I do not see why I would prevent myself from imagining anything whatsoever, if this imagining is the right one, and that what I am putting forward, is that the right one can only be certified by being able to be demonstrated, be demonstrated in the Symbolic, which means entitling it Symbolic, by a certain dislocation of \textit{la langue}, in so far as it gives access to what? To the unconscious.

The Imaginary remains nonetheless what it is, namely, precious (\textit{d`or}), and this is to be understood as, it sleeps (\textit{il dort}). It sleeps, as I might say, \textit{au naturel}. This in the measure that I do not especially awaken it, on the point of previous ethics. Too careful as I am of this, of this ethics, specifically, from which I would like to break, that precisely of the Good. But how can this be done if to wake up, is, on this occasion, to fall asleep again, if in the Imaginary, there is something that requires the subject to sleep?
Dreaming (rêver) does not simply have, in langage, the langage that I make use of, this astonishing property of structuring the awakening (rêvet!). It also structures the revolution, and the revolution, if we understand it carefully, is stronger than the dream. Sometimes, it is falling asleep again, but in a cataleptic way. I have to manage to promote, to make there enter for you into your cogitations the fact that the Imaginary is the prevalence given to a need of the body, which is to sleep. It is not that the body, the body of the speaking being, needs more sleep than other animals - without our still being able to know moreover how to give a sign of it - than the other (154) animals, who, for their part, function with sleep. The function of sleep, of hypnosis, in the speaking being, only takes on this prevalence of which I spoke to identify it to the Imaginary itself, only takes on this prevalence from the effects of this nodality, of this nodality which only knots, only knots the Symbolic to the Imaginary - but in fact you could put here any other couple of the three - only knots them from the agency, the agency of the three in so far as I make it that of the Real.

If then I wake you up to what all the same our ancient λαος кαγαθος allows us to date the formula in Aristotle's Sovereign Good. When I did the Ethics of psychoanalysis, it was to the Nicomachean Ethics that I referred, referred to as a starting point. But I was careful on this point not to wake up, because if I wake people up to the manifest Imaginary of this Sovereign Good, what are they not going to imagine? Not that there is no Good, which would take them a little bit too far for their own well-being, but that there is no sovereign, as a result of which, the effective sovereign, the one who knows how to use the knot, finds his satisfaction because it is by this, because it is by this that sleep makes itself desired by those, enough by those, for it to encounter among them the complicity of the dream, namely, the desire that it will continue to sleep well. It is appropriate then that every
statement should take care precisely in that it revive-olutionises by maintaining the reign of what he wakes up to.

A little parenthesis, since moreover this is not easy to comprehend as a motive of this discourse in which I find myself caught up, due to the fact of being its subject by my experience, the experience described as analytic.

Naturally, there are those who, in order that this experience should not put them up against it, do not expose themselves to it as such, but have all the same a suspicion of something that makes them itch. Those simply afflicted by the itch have not much imagination. When they smell something about the consequences of my discourse, they dig up some biographical feature, for example, the fact that I frequented the Surrealists and that my discourse bears the trace of it. It is all the same curious that I never collaborated with these aforesaid Surrealists. If I had said what I was thinking, namely, that with language, I mean, by making use of it, what they demolished, was the Imaginary, what would have happened! I would perhaps have woken them up. Woken them up with a start to the fact that I would have been found to have well and truly said, the fact is that between the one and the other of the (155) Imaginary and the Symbolic whose existence precisely they did not suspect, they re-established order.

Can I get you to understand that the fate of the speaking being, is that he cannot say, that he cannot even say: ‘I slept well’, namely, a deep sleep, ‘I slept well between this and that time’, for the simple reason that he knows nothing about it, his dreams framing this deep sleep having consisted in the desire to sleep. It is only on the outside, namely, when he is submitted to the observation of an electroencephalogram, for example, that it can be said, that effectively between such a time and such a time, the sleep was deep, namely, not inhabited by dreams, these dreams that I say are the tissue of the Imaginary, that they are the tissue of the Imaginary in so far as it is by
being caught up in the knot, this Real, that his need, his principal need becomes this elective function: the function of sleeping.

Is this passage of the Imaginary through the sieve of the Symbolic enough to give, to state the first, that of the Imaginary, the stamp of 'Good', fit to serve. To serve what? I do not believe I am forcing things in asking this question, because it must indeed be said, no one has ever approached this question without giving rise from some angle to an idea of sovereignty, namely, of subordination. It is true that the Good can only be called sovereign. Do you not sense that here is where there is exposed something like an infirmity – I am appealing to those who, have a wide awake Imaginary, on condition that this does not support among them any hope, because it is altogether understood that I am not saying, for my part, anything of the kind, but that I am not saying the contrary either: namely, that the Good is sovereign. So that in our day my saying operates in the aforesaid Imaginary, certainly, but it is not how it attacks it. It simply says that the Imaginary, is that by which the body ceases to say anything worthwhile by being written differently than: 'I slept from such a time to such a time.'

All this changes nothing in the fact that it makes us itch. The truth makes us itch, even those - without believing in it too much – that I call the rabblement, because, when all is said and done, it is enough for the truth to itch for it to touch the true from some angle. Say anything at all, it will always touch the true. If it does not touch yours, why would it not touch mine? Here is the principle of the analytic discourse, and that is why I said somewhere – and to someone (156) who, faith, produced a very nice little book on transference, someone called Michel Nevraut – I told him that by beginning as he did by what he called 'counter-transference', if by this he means the way in which the truth touches the analyst himself, he is surely on the right path, since after all, this is where the true takes on its primary importance, and that, as I have pointed out for a long time, there is  

He used to write an article for the "Journal of American..."(it's old)

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only one transference, that of the analyst, since after all he is the subject supposed to knowledge. He should clearly know what to stick to in this regard, in his relationship to knowledge, the point to which he is ruled by the unconscious structure that separates him, from this knowledge, which separates him from it even though he knows something about it, and I underline, as much by the test that he made of it in his own analysis as by what my saying can convey to him about it.

Does this mean, does this mean that transference is the entry of the truth? It is the entry of something which is the truth, but the truth of which precisely transference is the discovery, the truth of love.

This is worth noting. The knowledge of the unconscious, the knowledge of the unconscious was revealed, was constructed, this indeed is the value of this little book, it is its only value moreover, but this makes it worth buying, the truth of the unconscious, namely, the revelation of the unconscious as knowledge, this revelation of the unconscious was made in such a way that the truth of love, namely, the transference, only erupted into it. It came secondarily. And people have never clearly known to bring it back in, except in the form of misunderstanding, of the unexpected thing, the thing we do not know what to do with, except to say that it must be reduced, indeed even liquidated. This remark just by itself justifies a little book knowing how to highlight it, because moreover one must be penetrated by the fact that from experience, from analytic experience, the transference is what it expels, it is what it cannot tolerate without getting very bad stomach pains from it.

If love passes here along this narrow defile of what causes it, and by that fact reveals what is involved in its veritable nature, here there is, is there not here something which makes it worthwhile repeating the question about it? Because it is difficult not to admit that love holds a place, even if up to now we have been reduced, as they say, to paying our respects to it. We discharge our obligations with regard to love.
we pay our contribution to it, anyway, we try by every means, to allow it to distance itself, to hold itself satisfied.

How then tackle it? I promised at Rome, to give a lecture some day or other on love and logic. It was indeed in preparing it that I became (157) aware of the enormity, in short, of what my discourse supports. For it appeared to me that there was almost nothing in the past to account for it in the slightest way. That is how I notice that when all is said and done, it is not for nothing that Freud, in what I quoted the last time, namely, what is entitled the psychology that is described precisely as being that of the group and the analysis of the ego, while signalling that there he contrasts (confront) identification and love, and this without the slightest success, to try to make it acceptable that love participates in any way whatsoever in identification.

Simply, it is indicated there that love is concerned with what I isolate under the title of the Name of the Father. It is quite strange. The name of the father to which I made the ironic allusion that you know earlier, namely, that it is supposed to be related to the antiquity of the family, what does that mean? On this what does Oedipus, the aforesaid Oedipus teach us?

Well then, I do not think that this can be tackled head on. That is why, in what I proposed to say to you today, this no doubt in terms of an experience that had tired me out, I would like to show you how this name is minted, this name, this name that, that in few cases, we do not see in the least repressed. It is not enough to bear this name, for the one in whom the Other is incarnated, the Other as such, the Other with a capital O, the one I am saying, by whom the Other is incarnated, is only incarnated moreover, incarnates the voice, namely, the mother. The mother speaks, the mother through whom the word is transmitted, the mother, it must be clearly said, is reduced, to expressing this name by a no, precisely, the no the father says, which introduces us to the foundation of negation – is it the same negation which creates a circle in a world, which by defining some essence, an essence of a universal
nature, in other words what is supported by the all – precisely rejects, rejects what? – outside the all, led by this fact to the fiction of a complement to the all, and makes all men respond: by this fact [...] what is non-man, do you not feel that there is a gap from this non-logic to the nay-saying (dire-non)? To the propositional nay-saying, I would say, in order to support it. Namely, what I make function, in my schemas of sexual identification, namely, that not all men can acknowledge themselves in their essence, namely in their phallic enjoyment, to call it by its name, that not all men manage to ground themselves on this exception of something, the father, in so far as propositionally, he says no to this essence. The defile, the defile of (158) the signifier through which there passes this exercise of this something which is love, is very specifically this name of the father, this name of the father which is only no at the level of saying, and which is cashed in on by the voice of the mother in the nay-saying of a certain number of interdictions. This in the case, the fortunate case, the one in which the mother is willing indeed to make some nods of her little head.

There is something whose incidence I would like to designate. Because it is an angle on the moment that we are living through in history. There is a history, even though it is not inevitably the one that we believed. What we are living through is very precisely the following: that curiously, the loss, the loss of what might be supported by the dimension of love, if it is indeed the one not that I am saying, I cannot say it, I cannot say it. For this name of the father, there is substituted a function which is none other than that of naming-to (nommer-à). To be named to something is what is highlighted in an order which is effectively being substituted for the name of the father. Except for the fact that here, the mother all by herself is generally enough to designate its project, to trace it out, to indicate its path.

If I defined the desire of man as being the desire of the Other, it is indeed here that this is designated in experience. And even in the...
cases where, like that, by chance, in fact, it happens that by an
accident she is no longer there, it is all the same she, she, her desire,
that designates to her kid this project that is expressed by the naming-
to. To be named-to something, is what, for us, at this point of history
we are at, is found to be preferred — I mean effectively preferred, to go
before — what is involved in the name of the father.

It is quite strange that here, the social should take on the prevalence of
a knot, and which literally makes up the fabric of so many existences,
the fact is that it holds this power of naming-to to the point that after
all, there is restored an order, an order which is an iron one. What is
this trace, this trace designated, as return of the name of the father in
the Real, in so far precisely as the name of the father is verworfen,
foreclosed, rejected, and in this capacity it designates whether this
foreclosure which I said is the principle of madness itself; is this
naming-to not, is this naming-to not the sign of a catastrophic
degeneration?

To explain it, I must give its full meaning to what I designated by the
term that I write as 'ek-sistence'. If something ek-sists with respect to
something, it is very precisely because of not being coupled to it, of
(159) being thirded (trotse), if you will allow me this neologism. The
form of the knot, since moreover the knot is nothing other than this
form, namely, imaginable, is it not here that the imaginable is
designated as not being able to be thought? Thought, namely, put in
order, rooted not simply in the impossible, but in the impossible in so
far as it is demonstrated as such; nothing is demonstrated by this knot,
but simply shown. To show what is meant by ek-sistence, of a ring of
string to make myself understood, a ring of string in so far as it is only
on it that there reposes the knot of what otherwise remains mad.
Explanation having no grip on the inexplicable.

Is it not here that we ought to search in what possesses us, possesses
us as subjects, which is nothing other than a desire, and what is more
the desire of the Other, a desire by which we are alienated from the
start, is it not here that there ought to be brought to bear - namely, in
this phenomenon, this apparition to our experience, that as subjects, it
is not simply not having any essence, except to be squeezed, squeezed
in a certain knot, but moreover as subject, supposed subject of what
squeezes this knot - as subject it is not simply essence that we lack,
namely, being, it is besides that there ek-sists for us everything that
constitutes a knot. But to say that all of this ek-sists us does not mean
for all that that we exist in it in any way. It is in the knot itself that
there resides everything that for us is only when all is said and done
pathetic, which Kant rejected as if anticipating our ethics, namely, by
the fact that nothing of what we suffer can in any way direct us
towards our good. This indeed is something that must be understood
some way or other as a prodrome, as a prodrome I dare say, and that is
why I once wrote *Kant with Sade*, as a prodrome of what effectively
constitutes our passion, namely, that we no longer have any kind, any
kind of idea of what might trace out for us the path of the Good.

At the moment that that path peters our, at the moment when Kant
made the gesture of this slender recourse, of this tiny link with what
Aristotle had established as the order of the world, what are the
arguments that he puts forward? To make the dimension of duty
sensed, what does he put forward? What he puts forward is
supposedly that a lover close to obtaining success in his enjoyment
would look twice at it if, in front of the hall door, a gibbet was already
erected from which he was going to be hanged; and to oppose to this
(160) that of course no one would ever risk such a thing - while it is
on the contrary quite obvious that anyone at all is capable of doing it,
simply if he wants to. So then what does he oppose to that? It is that
- as if this were a sign of a superiority – it is that summoned by the
tyrant to defame another subject, anyone would look twice at it before
bearing false witness.

To which in my text, *Kant with Sade* – because I wrote very good
things, things that no one understood anything about, of course, but
that is simply because they are deaf – to which I opposed: but what if
to put into the tyrant’s hand the one the tyrant wants to get at, not a
false but a true testimony sufficed! Which is enough of course to
demolish all the systems because the truth, the truth is always for the
tyrant. It is always true that one cannot tolerate the tyrant, and as a
consequence, the tyrant always has reasons to get at the person he
wants. What he needs is a semblance of truth. The angle, the angle
from which Kant here makes the split, this angle is not the right one.
Hence there results the formula which is separated out simply from
these two terms between which Kant brings about the re-entry of
practical reason, namely, moral duty, which is that the essence, the
essence of what is at stake in the Good, is that the body forces its
enjoyment, namely, curbs it and this simply in the name of death, of
one’s own death or the death of someone else, on this occasion, the
one that he will imagine sparing. But once this formula is
circumscribed, does not this reduce the Good to its correct import, is it
not the case that outside these terms, these terms of which there are
made the three, the three of the Real, in so far as the Real itself is
three, namely, enjoyment, the body, death, in so far as they are
knotted, as they are knotted only, of course, by this unverifiable
impasse of sex, it is there indeed that there is conveyed the import (la
porte) of this newly arrived discourse as regards which it is not for
nothing that something should have necessitated it, the analytic
discourse whose relay you will allow me to take up again on the 9th
May, the 9th May the second Tuesday and not after that the third, but
the fourth, which will not be then the one after Easter, the 16th April
but that of the 23rd…….

The 9th April, not May, April!
Seminar 11: Tuesday 9 April 1974

Good, today… what’s happening? – today for reasons, like that, of personal choice, I am going to start from a question, a question of course that I ask myself, believing at least that the answer is there – that’s an old refrain, as you know – and this question is: what, what has Lacan here present, invented? You know that I put forward this word ‘invented’, I made it recognised by you, as I might say, apparently at least, by linking it to what necessitates it, namely, knowledge. Knowledge is invented, I said, which the history of science seems to me to testify to rather well. So then, what did I for my part, invent? This does not at all mean that, that I form part of the history of science, since my starting point is different, being that of analytic experience.

What? I will answer, because it is understood that I already have the answer – I will answer, like that, to get things going: the little o-object. It is obvious that I cannot add, the little o-object, for example. It, it can be touched immediately. It is not among Others that I invented the o-object, among Other things, as some people imagine. Because the o-object is solitary, is solitary at least at the (162) start, with the graph. You know perhaps what it is, I am not
even sure, but anyway it is something which has a shape like that, with two things that go across, there, and then in addition, that: I say that, because at the point that we are at it is necessary. From the graph, then, of which it is a determination and specifically at the point at which the question is asked: what is desire, if desire is the desire of the Other? Anyway, that is where it emerged. That does not mean of course, that it is not elsewhere. It is also elsewhere, it is also in the schema called the schema $L$ and then it is also in the quadrripodes of the discourses to which I believed I should give a place, in fact, some years ago. And then, who knows, perhaps there is a question of it being put at the place of the $x$ in these already celebrated quantifying formulae that today I will call like that because when I woke up this morning I wrote some notes, that I will call of sexuality. And while I was at it, in taking these notes, the following came to me, something which, of which it is curious anyway that I never hear echoes, is that not so. I obviously, even, even in Rome where I made a little trip, I heard tell of these quantifying formulae, which proves already rather widely diffused. And I was asked questions, namely, whether these quantifying formulae, because there are four of them, might well be situated somewhere in a way that, that would correspond with the formulae of the four discourses. This is... this is not necessarily unfruitful, because what I am evoking, anyway, is that the small $o$ comes at the place of the $x$ in the formulae that I call ‘quantifying formulae of sexuality’. Do I need to write them again, it would surely not be useless. I am recall that those marked by the are on the left, and are continued by four other formulae which are like that in a square, good.
Something might have come back to me about it if, of course, it did not require a little bit of trouble; but if there is something that I would like to point out to you, it is that these formulae described as quantifiers of sexuation could be expressed differently, and this would (163) perhaps allow progress to be made. I am going to tell you what is implied by it. It could be put like this: 'the sexed being is only authorised by him/herself'. It is in this sense that, that there is a choice, I mean that what one limits oneself to, in short, to classify them as male or female, to be officially registered, in short, this, this does not prevent there being a choice. This is something, of course, that everyone knows. He is only authorised by himself — and I would add: ‘and by some others’.

What is the status of these others, on this occasion, if not that it is somewhere, I am not saying in the locus of the Other, it is somewhere that must be clearly situated, known, where my quantifying formulae of sexuation are written. Because I would even say that I am going rather far: if I had not written them, would it be just as true that the sexed being is only authorised by himself?

This appears difficult to dispute, given that people had not waited for me to write these formulae, these quantifying formulae of sexuation in order for there to be, in short, a serious handful of people who are labelled ... as is done, in short, who are labelled with homosexuality. Neither on one side nor on the other. It would then be undeniably true, except for the fact that, a curious thing, in fact, it seems, that even though this has been widespread from all time, that people have spent some time precisely in labelling with these terms that, as chance would have it are wrong, by this term of ‘homosexual’, for example. It is curious that, that I can say they are wrong. In fact, it is altogether wrong as a nomination. Well before, in short, people did not have these terms, in short, this was called, for example — anyway for one side — and the fact that they were distinguished in a serious fashion even to the extent of giving them a different place on the geographical

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map is already sufficiently indicative. These were called, for one side, sodomites: *Sumum enim sodomitae*, wrote a prince who, I believe, was himself from the Condé family: *Sumum enim sodomitae igne tanti periturum*. He said that to reassure his companions when they were crossing a river: nothing can happen to us, we are not going to be drowned since we are *igne tanti periturum*, we must perish only in fire, so we are safe. Good.

In the meantime, might it not have come into someone’s head in my School that this balances my saying that the analyst is only authorised by himself? That does not mean for all that that he is all alone in (164) deciding it, as I have just pointed out to you, pointed out to you as regards what is involved in the sexed being. I will even say more, indeed, what I wrote in these formulae implies at least that, to make a man, there must at least be written somewhere the quantifying formula that I have just written there, and that there exists — it is a writing — that there exists, this x which says that it is not true, that it is not true, as a foundation for an exception (*comme fondement d’exception*), that it is not true that, namely, that what supports in writing the propositional function in which we can write what is involved in this choice of the sexed being, that it is not true that it holds up, that it always holds up, that even the condition for the choice to be made in a positive way, namely, that there should be something of the man, is that castration should be somewhere.

I am saying then that the analyst is authorised only by himself, which is something, in a word, so crushing, in a word, to think about, that if the analyst is something in the mode of... being named-to, to analysis, as I might say, to analysis in this form which *means*, well, an associate member, a titular member, some member or Other; everything that I tried like that with which I tried to make people laugh in a little article by marking the stages of what I called the Sufficiencies, the little Slippers, indeed the Blessed, to be named Blessed, is this not something that in itself might make you laugh a little? This made

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people laugh, but, but not very much, because at that time I wrote that, it only interested specialists, who for their part, scarcely laughed, of course, because they were in the system.

But this would imply all the same that this formula that I produced in an altogether pivotal Proposal, that this formula should receive the few complements, the few complements implied by the fact that if, assuredly one cannot be named to psychoanalysis, that does not mean that just anyone can enter into it like a rhinoceros into a china shop, namely, without taking account of the following. Which is that it must indeed be inscribed, that there must be inscribed what I expect from it being inscribed, because it is not like when I invent, like when I invent what presides over the choice of the sexed being. There, I cannot invent, I cannot invent for a reason that, that a group, that a group is Real. And even it is a Real that I cannot invent because of this fact that it is a Real that has newly emerged. Because as long as (165) there was not this analytic discourse, there was nothing of the psychoanalyst (du psychanalyste). This is why I announced that there is something of the psychoanalyst, of which for example, I, I was the testimony, but that does not mean for all that that there is a psychoanalyst. It is a properly hysterical perspective to say that there is at least one, for example; I am not at all on this slope, not being by nature in the position of the hysteric. I am not Socrates; for example. Where I situate myself in fact, we will eventually see, well, why not, but for today I do not need to say any more about it.

So there are things, there are things at the level of what emerges in terms of Real, in the form of a different functioning, of what? Of what is involved when all is said and done about letters, because letters, what is at stake is letters, this is what I wanted to put forward in my quadrupodes. There can be a certain way in which a certain bond is established in a group, there can be something new and which only consists in a certain redistribution of letters. That I can invent.
But the way of pursuing this new arrangement of letters in order to pinpoint in it a discourse, pre-supposes, pre-supposes a sequence, precisely, and why not, as I was asked, asked in Rome, when I was asked the question about what was the link between the four quantifying formulae of sexuation, what was their link with the formula – this is what was at stake – the formula of analytic discourse as I thought I should put it forward at first. To connect them up, this would be to give this development which would be made in a school, in mine, why not, with a little bit of luck, that in a school there would be articulated this function from which the choice of the analyst, the choice of being so, can only depend. Because while only being authorised by himself, he cannot but be authorised also by others. I am reducing myself to this minimum because, precisely, I am waiting for something to be invented, to be invented in the group without slipping into the old rut, the one from which it results that by reason of old habits, against which after all we are so little protected against that these are the very ones that form the basis of the discourse described as university, that one is named-to, to a title.

This pushes us, pushes us because I chose to be pushed there – but pushes you at the same time since you listen to me – to try to specify the link there is between the invention of knowledge and what is written. It is quite clear that there is a link. It is a matter, of specifying this link. In Other words, to notice, to ask the question about what one can put one’s finger on: where is there situated, where is writing situated? This indeed is what I have been trying to give you an indication of for a long time, by substituting, which I did very early, in sub-slipping as I might say, into the statement that I attempted to give about … the Function and field of speech and language. I did not all the same entitle a certain article, like that, a pivotal writing, I did not entitle it The agency of the signifier in the unconscious, I entitled it The agency of the letter and it is around letters, as you remember perhaps a bit, in short, like that, in the mist, that S, S₁, S₂, etc. over s, over small s. Anyway, it is all that, all this
implying a certain relation that I pinpointed as being that of metaphor, another one of metonymy, it is around that that I made turn a certain number of proposals that can be considered as a forcing, I mean as giving a certain agency not of the letter, but of linguistics. But I would point out to you that linguistics does not proceed any differently than the other sciences, namely, that it only proceeds from the agency of the letter, hence the agency of linguistics, passing by the letter, in short, to propose some remarks to those who practice analysis.

This does not prevent of course, because I believe that with time, well, is that not so, there are those Surrealists, is that not so, that I am pestered with. Anyway, when people want to write articles about me, these Surrealists, I knew one who still survived at that time, Tristan Tzara. I gave the Agency of the letter to him and of course, it meant nothing to him. Why? Because this indeed shows what I pointed out to you – you perhaps heard it – at my last seminar. What I pointed out to you, namely, that when all is said and done, with all this row, is that not so, they did not really know what they were at.

But that, that stemmed from the fact that, in short, they were poets, and as Plato pointed out a long time ago, it is not at all inevitable, it is even preferable that the poet does not know what he is doing. This is even, this is even what gives, this is what gives to what he does its primordial value. And before which one can truly, one can truly only bow one’s head. I mean that if one can make a certain analogy, anyway a certain homology, let us say – but with for the word homo (167) the approximate meaning that I underlined for you earlier – a certain homology between, between what one has in terms of works, works of art, and what we pick up in analytic experience.

Interpreting art, is something that Freud always ruled out, always rejected. What is called, what is called the psychoanalysis of art, well, is still more to be ruled out than the famous psychology of art which is
a delusional notion. With art, we have to learn a lesson (prendre de la graine). Learn a lesson, learn a lesson for something else, namely, for us, to make of it this third which is not yet classified, to make of it this something which, which leans on science on the one hand, which learns a lesson from art on the other. And I will even go further, it can only be done in the expectation of having at the end to fail to find the answer.

What analytic experience testifies for us, is that we are dealing, I would say with untameable truths, with untameable truths that we...that we nevertheless have to bear witness to, as such. Are these the only ones that can allow us to define how, in science, what is involved in knowledge, in unconscious knowledge, how, in science, this may constitute what I will call an edge, namely, that by which science itself, as such, is, for want of a better word, I will say structured. If what I am putting forward to you corresponds to something, I mean that you waited long enough on me before I stated that there was no sexual relationship, that is what this means.

There again I underline that this does not go so far as to say that the little Real that we know, which is reduced to number, that the little Real that we know, if it is so little, this stems from the famous hole, to the fact that in the centre there is this topos, that one can only plug; that one can only plug with what? With the Imaginary. But that does not mean for all that the little o-object, belongs to the Imaginary. It is a fact that it can be imagined, it can be imagined in whatever way one can, namely, with what is sucked, with what is shitted, with what constitutes the look, what tames the look, and then, and then the voice. It is I who have added to the list the two last in number, in any case certainly the last one in so far as it is imagined.

But the fact that it is imagined removes nothing from the import of the little o-object as topos. I mean, as what is squeezed to give an image of it. I have done nothing more to give an image of it which has only

Topos - A type of category which allows the formation of all of mathematics
one advantage, which is that it is a written image, the one that I gave (168) in the Borromean knot. It is here that the little o-object is knotted. There are therefore two faces, here, to the little o-object, a face that is as Real as possible, simply by the fact that it is written.

You see what I am trying to do, there, I am trying to situate writing for you, and it goes a long way to put it forward, as this edge of the Real, situated on this edge.

In order, because I must, in fact give you different fodder than this abstraction, as you would say, because precisely what is tangible here, is that this is not an abstraction. It is as hard as iron. It is not because a thing is not succulent that it is abstract. It is obviously amusing that I experience here the need, for you, the desire of man being the desire of the Other, that I experience here the need for you to have a little funny interlude, to point out to you that it is amusing, in fact, a thing, a little anecdotal sample that I am going to give you, is that not so. It is rather curious, for example, that knowledge, in so far as it is invented, happens like that, as I am going to tell you. When Galileo noticed, in short, some of his inventions, in fact, which completely upset knowledge about the celestial Real, he took care to note it, in the following form. He sent to some people a certain number of Latin couplets, no more, two lines, in which, through which he could in a way fix the date, and by taking a certain number of letters from three to three, for example, demonstrate that he had invented the thing that was impossible to swallow at his time, that he had already invented at such a date. I mean that it was indisputably inscribed by the very way in which he had made these couplets, whose content moreover does not matter, given that of course, one can in fact write anything whatsoever in this style, this does not matter to anyone, all that interests someone, when one receives a letter from a personage like Galileo, it is not what he wanted to say, it is that one has an autograph. And the way under what, in a way, we will call the apparent stupidity of these two lines, there was inscribed, in short, the date, the date of a particular thing, the thing that was at stake, namely, about the sky and

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the principle of the journeyings that it offers to our sight, is this not something that illustrates in a way that is certainly only amusing, but you have many other illustrations of it, since as I did it, I insisted with leaden feet, it is obvious that if logic is what I am saying, the science of the Real, and not something else, if precisely what is proper to logic, and qua science of the Real, is precisely to make of the truth (169) only an empty value, namely, exactly nothing at all, something about which you simply write that non-T is F, namely, that it is false, namely, that it is a way of treating the truth that has no kind of relationship with what we commonly call truth. This science of the Real, logic, cleared its way, could only clear its way from the moment when people had been able to sufficiently empty words of their meaning to substitute letters purely and simply for them. The letter is in a way inherent to this passage to the Real. Here it is amusing to be able to say that the writing was there to prove, to prove what, to prove the date of the invention. But in proving the date of the invention, it proves also the invention itself, the invention, is the written, and what we require in a mathematical logic, is very precisely the fact that nothing in the demonstration reposes on anything but a certain way of imposing on oneself a combinatorial perfectly determined by an interplay of letters.

Here I ask the question: is the anagram then, since this is what is at stake in the verses of Galileo, the anagram about which our dear Saussure racked his brains in private, is the anagram not simply here to prove that this is the nature of writing, even when people have not yet the idea of there being anything to prove. Is the anagram at the level that Saussure questioned himself about it, namely, at the level where in verses described as Saturnian, one can rediscover precisely the number of letters required to designate a god without there being anything in the heavens to help us to know whether it was the intention of the poet, to have riddled what he had to write, since the writing, already functioned, to have riddled it with a certain number of letters that ground the name of a god.

\textit{Anagram = a way or phrase forced by transposing the letters of another word or phrase}
Can we not sense here that even when it is not supported by anything, by nothing to which we can bear witness, we must admit that it is the writing that supports it, that we have here, that we have here a sort of entity of the written. How will we express entity (entité), are we going to push it towards the side of being or towards the side of a particular being (l'êtant), is it ousta or is it on? I think it would be better to abandon this direction.

And I am proposing something to you which is of interest because it goes in the same direction as what I have previously traced out; as was remarked, like that, by an old sage, at the time when people knew all the same already how to write what was required by language, is that not so, a road that ascends is the same as the one that descends, so (170) then, I could propose to you as a formula of writing, the knowledge supposed subject (le savoir supposé sujet). That there is something which attests that such a formula may have its function, it is in any case the best that I can find today to situate for you the function of writing, for this reason and that...to what our question about the entity of writing ousta or on, introduced us to, to situate the fact that it is defined above all by a certain function, by the place of the edge.

There you are. It is quite evident is it not, that as – I underlined it like that, incidentally because I spend my time having it out with philosophers – it is quite evident that it is my kind of materialism. Yeah. I scarcely say it, I scarcely say it because I don’t give a damn about materialism. This certain materialism, like that, which is always there, which consists in kissing the ass of matter in the name of the fact that it is supposed to be something more Real than the form, in short, that, of course, has already been cursed. It has been cursed starting from historical materialism which is strictly nothing Other than a resurgence of Bossuet’s Providence. Yeah. In any case, this material of the written, in short, of the supposed written, like that,
of the suicide right was finally overturned in the highest court.
because it is the little new, in short, would deserve to have its dugs
pulled a little, in order to come back to our fundamental little o-object.
Let it be exploited a little, at least for a while, huh.

For this exploitation to become possible is that not so, it is... that
means precisely, if you translate modality as I have taught you, that
means that it ceases to be written, and not at all the contrary. This
must cease to be written for it to prove something. Namely, that it
does not cease starting up again. But precisely here is this scansion of
which I am trying, of which I am trying to give you an idea. It is a
scansion which is curious. Because the pulsation that it implies,
namely, what everyone knows, only the possible can be necessary;
namely, what I situate by the ‘ceasing to be written’, is precisely
something which does not cease to be repeated, which is here
something that we have been clearly able to touch, is that not so, in
this function of repetition produced with such genius by Freud.

This is a fundamental thing and I am trying to approach it here for
you, to approach it in this sense that this establishes a time two (un
temps deux). Far from making time linear, this establishes a time two
as altogether fundamental. And I would even go as far as to ask the
(171) question of those who might be able to say a little bit about it to
me, and I would be very amused if someone were to reply to me, on
this point. The fact is that in taking a set of dimensions, set not
supposing anything cardinal, but let us say a finite set—how
determine on this set of dimensions, why not imagine the dimension
as I define it, namely, there where the saying is situated, how arrive at
formulating the fact that if we start from the idea that the function of
two, two dimensions are situated there on one side of the surface, but
from ‘to cease’ and ‘to non-cease’ as I have just said to you, is there
not here something which gives very exactly the import of writing? In
Other words, on a set of dimensions, that we will not determine in
advance, how find what acts as surface-function and which at the
same time according to my saying would make a time-function?
Which is in any case very close, very close to the knot that I am suggesting to you.

I formerly risked producing something called Logical time. And it is curious that I put a second time in it, the time to comprehend, the time to comprehend what is there to be comprehended. It is the only thing in this form that I made as refined as possible, it was the only thing that had to be comprehended. The fact is that the time to comprehend does not work if there are not three. Namely, what I called the instant of seeing, then the thing to comprehend, and then the moment to conclude. To conclude, as I believe I sufficiently suggested in this article, to conclude wrongly. Otherwise, if there are not these three, there is nothing to justify what manifests with clarity the two, namely, this scansion that I described, which is that of an arrest, of a ceasing and of a re-departure. Thanks to which it is obvious that these are the only convincing movements, which are valid as proof, is that not so, when the three characters for whom as you know it is a matter of them getting out of prison, as it happens, it is only subsequent to these scansion that they can make them function as proof, namely, do what they are asked, not simply that they should have got out, which is a quite natural movement, but what they are identical to, namely, each one strictly to the two Others. They have the same, the same black or white ring on their backs. They cannot, which is what is asked of them, give an explanation for it unless from the fact that they have all performed the same ballet to get out. That is the only explanation.

It is a way which is altogether, well, altogether charming, is that not so, to explain something which is furthermore quite obvious. The fact is that this does not involve any kind of identity of nature among them, that the illustration, the commentary in the margin that I give of it, namely, that it is like that people imagine some universality or other. There is no trace of it in this apologue—since we are dealing with an apology—there is no trace in this apologue of the slightest relationship between the prisoners since precisely this is what is
prohibited to them: namely, to communicate among themselves. They are simply, identifying themselves or distinguishing themselves by having or not having a white disk or a black disc on their backs. I apologise for being so long for people who have never opened the *Ecrits*, there must be many here in this situation, of course. To define then what in a set of dimensions, constitutes at the same time surface and time, this is what I am proposing to you as a follow up, good God, as a follow-up, to what I propose to you about logical time in my *Ecrits*. Good. Yeah.

Am I, am I a bad judge when I answer that the little o-object was perhaps what I had invented...Perhaps, it is surely, in any case... no one invented it apart from me. Good. But I may be all the same be a bad judge. And that is why it is not unrelated to *poussin* like that, which I used like a rag earlier. The fact is that if my schema of analytic discourse is true, I must become this little o-object, this is what I have to make come to pass. It is not the 'I', in my case, namely, when I am in front of you. It is the small o. Yes, this place of no one (*personne*) is of course, as the name of person indicates, a place of rank to be held as semblance, is that not so. It is a matter of holding the role of the analyst. And this indeed is why I put forward a certain something, that is what is asked by the question which is always the same: 'Can I be it?' To authorise myself, might just about pass, huh, but to be it is a different matter. It is here that obviously, there is forged what I stated with the verb *désèt[e*]. I 'un-am' the analyst: the little o-object has no being.

I insisted sufficiently, is that not so, I insisted sufficiently at one time on something that psychoanalysts exult in, is that not so, namely, this face, this support, this pathetic aspect of the little o-object when it takes on the form of a waste scrap. I insisted a lot on it, one day, I turned up like that at Bordeaux, and I explained to them that civilisation was a sewer, that there is strictly no other kind of trace of (173) it, and that it is all the same something quite strange, that we

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should turn our minds to it. Because as far as we know all the other animals that exist do not encumber the earth with their waste, while it is altogether singular that, that everything that man makes, always ends up as waste, is that not so. A single thing which preserves a little dignity, are the ruins, but get out of your shells all the same, a little bit and you will notice the number of broken-down automobiles that are piled up in places, and you will notice that wherever you put your foot, you put your foot on something that – where people have tried in every possible way to recompress old rubbish in order not to be submerged by it, literally.

Yes... it is a whole business that! It is a whole business of organisation, is that not so. Of imaginary organisation, as one might say. To simulate, to simulate with the crowd, because it is the other face of what I earlier called the choice, the group, simulate with the crowd – and you always have to deal with that when you are assembling a group – to simulate with the crowd something that functions like a body. Yeah. Good. But anyway, this little object, all the same what is that... or what is the face of what interests you, not when I write it – because I write it as little as I can, I have too much of a sense of my responsibilities for me not to leave this writing its chance, its chance of ceasing, in order that, if it does not cease, it proves itself. But there, there when I am chatting, what interests you, about this little of which I speak? There is something that may indeed come into my head, because it is like all the rest, huh, I invent as regards what is involved in knowledge, but as regards what is involved in the truth, I do not invent; the truth is brought to me, I have whole buckets of it.

And then, there is a chap who came to see me, I cannot say how long ago, and then I would not want him to recognise himself, he came to tell me that what he needed, was my voice! It was not for a vote (voice), huh, it was the voice. No, but it is a very serious question, for me, is it the voice – because it is quite obvious that there is something
here. It is not a question of timbre, if the little o-object is what I am
saying, we must not confuse _the phonetic and the phoneme_. The voice
is defined by something Other than what is inscribed on a disc, and on
a magnetic tape the way so many people entertain themselves, it is
nothing to do with that. _The voice can be strictly the scansion with
which I tell you all of that._ I am persuaded that there is here a source
(174) of your gathering in this enclosure, a gathering that today is
decent. There is something, like that, that is linked to... to the time
that I spend in saying things, since _the little o-object is linked to this
dimension of time_. It is completely distinct to what is involved in the
saying.

_The saying, is not the voice._ And to be loved, since you love me, of
course, to be loved for the one or for the other, is not at all the same,
huh. _The saying that the little o-object involves, in short, is all sorts of
things that I even set down in writing_, huh, _Subversion of the subject
and dialectic of desire_, and so on and so forth. That is on a completely
different path, is that not so, _than the exhibition of the voice, namely,
like that, of a pathetic testimony, make no mistake, is that not so, of it
being squeezed in this whole affair.

On the other hand, _the saying, the saying is not writing either._ Yeah.
Saying is not writing either, it is not enough to have something to say
to be able, to be able to know a lot about it. It is a distinction, is that
not so, that I would very much like for you to get into your little
heads. Yes. _Even about what is involved in the truth_, is that not so,
there is a place for knowledge. There is a place for knowledge in so
far as there is question, at every instant, of inventing, is that not so, to
reply to the tissue of contradictions of the truth, huh. And this indeed
is why _the first step to be taken, is to follow it in all its affectations._ It
is not simply a matter of the fact, is that not so, that the lie forms part
of it. I insisted enough on that, is that not so. And it must be seen, in
fact, what it is capable of making you do.

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**Affectations:** 1. A show, a pretence; a display

2. Behaviour that is assumed _rather than natural_, artificially.

3. A particular habit, as of _speech or dress_, adopted to give
_a false impression._
The truth, my dear friends, leads to religion. You never understand anything about what I tell you about this thing because I seem to be sneering, is that not so, when I speak about it, about religion. But I am not sneering, I am grinding my teeth! It leads to religion, and to the true, as I already said. And since it is the true, that is precisely why there would be something to be got out of it for knowledge. Namely, to invent. Well then you are not equipped to do it, huh! And it is not tomorrow that you will get to the end of it. Because into all of that you put absolutely no seriousness. It is obvious, is it not, that those who invented the most beautiful things about knowledge – I name them, huh, it is an honours list, huh: Pascal, Leibniz, and Newton! Newton, in fact, do you Realise what Newton wrote about the Book of Daniel and about the Apocalypse of St. John! You have never looked at that, of course, because it is not in paperback, but I (175) regret it. I do not reproach you either for not having gone looking for it. There should be a paperback of that and one well translated. He had a cast-iron belief in religion. And the two Others... it seems to me that it is difficult to renounce what is obvious, huh. They talk of nothing but that. It is even the only thing that interests them.

When one... I must... when I think that I have to go looking in the middle of, a mountain of ‘addresses to the curé of Paris’, what Pascal wrote about the cycloid, for example, anyway which is the very type, is it not, of the step which meant that people invented, nothing less than integral calculus – do you imagine that integral calculus is nothing other than writing? The parabola from which it started - the parabola - I am talking about the parabola that is traced out, the parabola and then any Other lunule or thingamajig or yoke, whatsoever, in short, these are written things, it is only there that we touch what is involved in the Real. Good, these three were passionate about the true. The true about the true.
The path to take is to start up again. If you do not question in an
appropriate way the true of the Trinity, well you are made, you are
made like rats, like the rat man. It is obvious, it is obvious all the
same that religion, anyway has its limits, all the same! Anyway, I
have just come back from Italy, you understand, so I am, so I am
swamped by bodies that stream down all the walls, in a word, there is
nothing but that. There are enough pictures to stifle you, moreover it is
altogether magnificent, but I do not see why I should say *proh pudor!*
before this streaming of bodies. But anyway, this gives all the same its
limit to the thing, it shows all the same that one is in the truth, and that
one remains there, that one does not get out of it. What is required,
what would be at stake, is to get out of the truth, there, indeed I do not
see any other way except inventing, and to invent in the right way, in
the analytic way, is that not so, it is to start up again, to go along
entirely in this direction is that not so. Yes. Yes.

There is only one thing which is all the same quite annoying and on
which I would like to end if you, if you don’t mind. It is not by
chance that it is among my pupils, a woman, she is made like that, she,
good, well, produced like that a whole lot of chattering about the
desire to know; it is certainly not from me that she got it... I never
even, even suggested such a thing, huh. Yes. There is no shadow of a
desire to know, apart from something about which I question myself
(176) and about which I have nothing to tell you because I don’t know
anything about it, which is that there is mathematics, which cannot
proceed, it seems to me, unless it is an effect of the unconscious,
which do not produce the slightest desire, but it is all the same curious
to see that mathematics continues. People imagine that there are
among people of your kind, in short, namely, that the mathematicians,
are – I think that there are perhaps not two of them in this room, I am
talking about the true, the Really bitten: there is not the slightest desire
to know. There is not the slightest desire to *invent* knowledge.
Anyway, there is a desire to know attributed to the Other. One sees that. That is how there arises, anyway, the manifestations of complacency that the child gives in his ‘whys’. Everything that he poses as a question, in fact, is designed to satisfy what he supposes the Other would want him to ask. Not all children, huh! Not all children, because I am going to do a little thing for you, I must from time to time give you a little something to get your teeth into, this thing attributed to the Other, is very often accompanied by a ‘very little for me’ (très peu pour moi). And ‘very little for me’, a ‘very little for me’ of which the child gives proof in this form to which I am sure you have not dreamt, but, as you know, I also learn something every day. I educate myself, I educate myself of course along the line of what I like, along the line of what I invent inevitably, but anyway I do not lack food. And if you knew as I know, is that not so, the degree to which what I already illustrated about anorexia nervosa by making this action state, for an action states: ‘I eat nothing’.

But why do I eat nothing? That is something you have not asked yourselves, huh, but if you ask the anorexics, or rather if you let them come, I for my part have asked it, I have asked it because I was already in my little vein of invention on this subject, I asked it: so then what did they answer me? It is very clear: she was so preoccupied about knowing whether she was eating, that in order to discourage this knowledge, this knowledge like that, the desire to know, is that not so, just for that the kid would have let herself die of hunger! That is very important. This dimension of knowledge is very important, and also to notice that, that it is not desire that presides over knowledge, it is horror.

(177) Yes. You will tell me that, you will tell me that there are people who work, and who work like that to get the agregation. But that, you understand, has nothing to do with the desire to know. That is a desire which is, which is as I might say, as always the desire of the Other, and I already explained that it is enough for the Other to desire for, of
course, one to fall under its influence. The desire of man is the desire of the Other but the circuit is more or less complicated. There is the desire of the Other, which, which, which is communicated on an equal footing because it is already at sea in the Other, the subject.

There is the hysteric. The hysteric, is another affair, huh, I will have to take up my schema, is that not so, to show you the exact place held by knowledge, is that not so, for the hysteric. It is a knowledge, in short, that is particularly specified, is that not so, it is a knowledge from which, from which she picks up the thing. Yes. It is a knowledge that does not go very far. It is a knowledge which to stick to the origin - it is a knowledge which is very often, not produced by discourse, the desire of the Other, but palmed off, as one might say.

I mean that it can very well be that a person, in short, who, who had not the slightest desire to know anything about anything whatsoever, is that not so, noticed all the same that in society, the university discourse assures for those who know, a good place, and that it is palmed off on the young one, here, to the kid who is going to become hysterical, and precisely for that reason, that it is palmed off to her that it is a means to power. Naturally, she receives the thing, for her part, without knowing that that is why, she receives it when she is very young, and there, it is a rather frequent case of transmission, in fact, is that not so of the desire to, of the desire to know, but it is something that is acquired altogether secondarily. In other words, what I am trying to get into your head and in connection with this experience, with this experience of the child, who naturally speaks to you about these 'whys', and these 'whys' which concern: Why this, why are children born, how is that done, etc., and all they want is, it is to hear something which, which gives pleasure, which, to show that, who, that they do everything as if they were interested in it. But as soon as they know it, they repress it, as you know well, and they repress it immediately, in fact, they think no more about it, in fact. You should all the same have an idea that is a little clearer about what
(178) is really happening. This desire to know, in so far as it takes on a substance, takes on the substance of the social group.

In truth, I will not go so far as to be satisfied with this answer as regards mathematical invention, is that not so. It is quite clear that there are people bitten by that, is that not so, I mean that solving the problem of the cycloid was not a way of promoting oneself at the Sorbonne. There was, like that, in fact a miraculous time, a time that that I would like to see being reproduced, is that not so in the form of psychoanalysts, I would like to see being reproduced in them this kind of Republic, is that not so, which meant that Pascal corresponded with Fermat, with Roberval, with Carcavi, with a whole pile of people, is that not so who were all interrelated with one another, in fact, in order that something or other should happen. This indeed is what I would want one day to draw out of the story, something or Other happened which ensured that there were people who wanted to know more about the most unlikely things, is that not so, who drew for themselves like that the cycloid. You know what it is, is that not so, whether it is a circle, a little wheel that turns around another one, you can see what that can give, that gives, I don't know, something like that which is called cardioid, which you can believe, at that moment, did not confer anything, with any Lord, is that not so, that made their reputation. In fact their thing was strictly among themselves, is that not so, they did not go outside that.

Naturally, from there, there has come your television, this television thanks to which you are definitively stupefied, good, good but anyway, they did not do it for that, they provided for the little o-object – of course, but precisely it was without knowing it, but they had all the same, in a word, all the better realised that the object was the little o-object, namely, what you are stifled by, is that not so. They realised it all the more in that without knowing where they were going, they passed by the structure, by the structure that I told you, namely, this edge of the Real.
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Seminar 12: Tuesday 23 April 1974

Good, I am going first of all, by beginning three minutes before the time, I am going first of all to fulfil a duty that I did not carry out the last time. I did not do so, because I believed it would happen all by itself, but since even in my School, I saw that no one had taken this step, I am encouraged to urge others to take it. A book has just appeared in the Champ Freudiern, as they say, huh, it is a collection which, as it happens, I direct. If it has appeared in this collection, I am obviously not uninvolved, I even had to force it into it. This book is called — this is a title — this one is worth as much as any other — is called: L'Amour du Censeur. It is by someone called Pierre Legendre, who happens to be a professor in the Law Faculty. There you are. So then, I strongly encourage those who, I do not really know why, indeed, are gathered together here around what I am saying, I strongly encourage them to get to know it, namely, to read it, to read it with a little attention because they will learn something from it.

There you are. With that, I begin.

I begin, or rather I begin again. This is what most astonishes me. Namely, that I have the opportunity each time to notice that if I spoke of hope in certain terms, in connection with a Kantian question that I was asked: ‘whether I might…’, ‘what might I hope for’? And I had said that hope, I had retorted that hope was something proper to each (182) one. There is no common hope. It is quite useless to hope for a
common hope. So then I, I am going to admit mine to you. It is the one that possesses me all week until the morning when I wake up with you in mind – namely, for example this very morning – until that moment, I, always have the hope that it will be the last time, that I will be able to say to you n, i, ni: finished. The fact that I am here, because the day when I say it, it will be before, it will before beginning, the fact that I am there proves to you that, however special this hope may be for me, it is disappointed.

Good, as a result of which, in waking up, I naturally thought of something quite different than, than what I had fomented to say to you. There arose in me like that, in short, that if there is – I already said it, in short, but I must repeat it – that if there is something which analysis has discovered the truth of, it is the love of knowledge. Since, at least if what I point out to you has some emphasis, an emphasis that moves you, transference reveals the truth of love and precisely in that it is addressed to what I stated as being the subject supposed to know. That may appear to you, after what I stated the last time, with I believe some emphasis, at least I imagine so, anyway I hope you remember it, not only did I put forward that there was no desire to know, but I even spoke about something which...that I effectively articulated about the horror of knowing. There you are.

So then, how connect that up, as I might say? Well precisely it is not connected up. It is the Marriage of heaven to hell. There is someone called William Blake, as you know, who at his time, at his epoch, with his with his own little material – which was not slight – who stirred up that: he even gave it exactly this title. There you are. So then perhaps what I am in the process of saying to you, is that the marriage in question is not quite what is believed. What is believed, in reading William Blake, precisely. Yeah. This only re-emphasises something that I told you elsewhere, something that our experience implies in any case, the analytic experience that I am only here to situate for you.
What is a truth if not a complaint? At least this is what corresponds to what we charge ourselves with, as analysts, if in short there is something of the psychoanalyst, that we charge ourselves with gathering. We do not gather it all the same without noting that division marks it. Marks the truth. That perhaps not-all of it can be (183) said. There you are. It is our way (voie), the way people have been speaking about for a long time, huh. And if it is put first in a statement that, that I hope is finally making your ears ring, if it is put first – it is indeed because this is what is at stake first, even though the solutions that are put forward greatly differ among themselves. It is a matter of having a little idea of our own. And then immediately after, when one states this term, the way, immediately afterwards people talk about the truth which, if it is what I have just said, is something like a rotten plank, and then as a third, people dare, anyway someone, in any case, has dared, like that: someone called Saint John, he spoke about life. These are imprudent emissions. Emissions of what? Of the voice. Of the voice which is to be written quite differently: v, o, i, x, for these. They are imprudent emissions of the voice that state these couplings. You can note that this... that the coupling, on this occasion, goes in threes. And what is life on this occasion? It is indeed something which, which in this three, then, makes, makes, makes, makes a hole, huh. I do not know if you know what life is, huh, but it is all the same curious that, that it creates a problem. Life (lavie) that on this occasion I would write indeed as I did, as I did with langue in a single word. This would only be to suggest that, that we do not know much about it except that it needs washing (elle s'lavie). It is almost the only tangible mark of what enters into life.

Anyway, these couplings, what am I suggesting here, starting from the experience that is defined as analytic, what am I suggesting here? Is it to think out these couplings? Yeah. If that were it, it would be in short, this kind of tipping over, which would mean falling into University discourse. That is where people think. Namely, where they fuck. Good, I am pointing out to you that in this discourse, I am
not – like that, it is a little test, simply, it is not at all that I pride myself on it, I am not accepted, I am rather put up with, yes, tolerated – all that brings us back to the status, to the status of, of what I stated the last time, anyway, linked to our relationship, of you, of me, and that I put in suspense between the voice and the act of saying. I dare hope that the act of saying has a greater weight in it, even though this is what I might doubt, since this doubt is what I expressed the last time as such. If it is the act of saying, this is what I get from a codified experience.

I also stated – you see, in insist on repeating myself – I also stated the (184) following: what is required, in the sense of what is lacking, so that this codified experience is not, should not be within everybody’s reach? It is not a question of the division of labour, namely, that everybody cannot spend their time analysing the rest. It is not within everybody’s reach, due to a fact of… of structure about which I tried to recall the last time, or at least to indicate what I intended to connect it up with. It cannot be within everybody’s reach to fulfil this office that I defined just now as gathering up the truth as a complaint.

What is the status of this marriage that I evoked just afterwards, by putting it under the patronage of William Blake? When I say that it is not within everybody’s reach, that goes a long way, that implies that there are those for whom it is in short prohibited. And when I state things thus, I intend to set myself apart from what is involved in something, in something that Hegel advances somewhere, about this rejection, inscribed, he says, in what he calls ‘the law of the heart’, this rejection of the disorder of the world. Hegel shows that if that is done, it is easy. And he is quite right. It is not a matter of producing here the disorder of the world, it is a matter of reading the not-all in it. Is this a substitute for the idea of order? This is very specifically what, into what I am proposing today to advance, to advance; with this question left just now. of what pushes me. What pushes me to bear witness to it.
What does this not-all consist in? It is obvious that it cannot be referred to what would make an all, to...to a harmonious world. So must the not-all be grasped somewhere in an element? An element which sins precisely by not being harmonised with it? Is it enough that, that everything in it should be won over – allow me here, to put it forward – to bifurcation, to the tree. Yeah. I would point out to you that here, as if nothing was happening, by asking you a question like that, this bifurcation, is also indeed what I have just made, a sign, a y, of something which is tangible, in short, with what we are clearing the way for: there is the tree, there is the vegetable, it makes up a branch, it is its mode of presence. And I do not see why I would not wade in there, into something which all the same is recommended to our attention, because it stems from writing, huh: the old Urszene, the primal scene, as it is inscribed in the Bible, at the beginning of the aforesaid Genesis. The tempter, huh. And then the fathead, is that not so, the one called Eve. And then the ass hole of all ass holes, is that not so, the first Adam? And then what circulates, there, the thing that gets stuck in his throat, the apple as it is called. And worse that’s not (184) all, huh: there is the Grandaddy who turns up and then let’s fly at them.

For my part, when I read that, I am not against it. I am not against it since it is full of meaning. This indeed is precisely what it must be cleansed of. Perhaps if...one scratched away all the meaning huh, one would have a chance of reaching the Real. This is even what I am in the process of teaching you. That it is not the meaning of the complaint that is important for us, it is what one might find beyond, as definable in terms of Real, yeah. Only to clean away the meaning, it must not be forgotten, because otherwise it turns into a shoot, huh, and in all of that there is something that is forgotten. And it is precisely the tree. What is outrageous is that it is not noticed is that it was what was forbidden. It was not the snake, it was not the apple, it was not the assholes, him or her: it was the tree that was not to be approached!
And nobody thinks any more about it, it is admirable! But for its part, what does the tree think about it? Here I am making a leap, huh, because what does that mean, what does it think about it? That means nothing other than something that is in suspense, and this is very precisely what makes me suspend everything that can be said under the heading of life, of the life that is washed. Because despite the fact that the tree is not washed — that can be seen! — despite that, does the tree enjoy? It is a question that I would call essential. Not that there might be an essence outside the question: the question is the essence, there is no other essence than the question. Since there is no question without an answer, I have been dinning that into you for a long time, this means that the essence also depends on it, on the answer. Only there, it is missing. It is impossible to know whether the tree enjoys, even though it is no less certain that the tree is life. Yeah.

I apologise to you for having, like that, imagined that, imagined presenting that to you, like that, with the help of the Bible. The Bible does not frighten me. And I would even say more, I have a reason for that. It is because there are people like that who are formed by it, huh, they are generally called Jews. One cannot say that they have not thought about this thing, the Bible. I would even say more: everything proves, everything proves in their history [to Madame Gloria Gonzales: Give me a cigar...], everything proves in their history that they are not preoccupied by the way that they have talmudized, as they say, this Bible. Well then I must recognise that it has worked out well for them. And where do I put my finger on that? I put my finger on it from the fact, yes, that they have truly well (186) contributed, when it came within their reach, to this domain that interests me, even though it is not mine — mine in the sense of the domain of analysis — that they have truly contributed, with particular astuteness, to the domain of science. What does that mean? It is not they who invented it.
The history of science started from a questioning about (put that in inverted commas, I beg you) about 'nature', about phusis — in connection with which Mr. Heidegger wriggles in convolutions. What was nature for the Greeks, he asks himself. They had an idea of nature. It must be said that the idea that they had of it - as the same Heidegger suggests - is completely lost. It is lost, lost, lost, lost. I do not see why one would regret it! Since it is lost, huh? Well then, it is not to be mourned at all that much because we know even more about what it is. Yeah. We know even more about what it is because it is quite obvious that if science has succeeded, has succeeded in emerging, it does not appear, moreover, that the Jews put much of themselves into it at the beginning. It is subsequently, when the prize had been won, that they came to add their grain of salt, huh, and that it was noticed, that, it is clear, in short, what Einstein, by adding something to the great construction of Newton, that he is the one who takes things from the right angle. And then he is not the only one, there are others — that I will name for you when the occasion arises, but I cannot speak about everything at the same time, because they are to be found in profusion and then they are not all in the same quarter. What is certain is that, it is all the same striking that, that this blessed thing, written, was enough, the Scriptures par excellence, as they say! — that this was enough for them to enter into the thing the Greeks have prepared and prepared by something which is not to be distinguished from writing, from writing in so far as what specifies it, in short, is that it is possible to read it, that when it is read, it gives a saying (un dire) - an extraordinary saying, naturally, as I told you earlier about this scene that would make you collapse (à la mords-moi le doigt), a saying that would make you think you are sleepwalking - but a saying! It is quite clear that if the Talmud has a meaning it consists precisely in emptying this saying of its meaning, namely, of only studying the letter. And from this letter to induce absolutely crazy combinations, in the style of the equivalence of the letter and the number, for example, but it is all the same curious that this is what formed them,
and that they find themselves up to date when they have to deal with science... Yeah!

(187) So then, that is what authorises me, I would say to do like them, not to consider as a forbidden field what I will call religious froth (mousse) to which I had recourse earlier. What I call 'froth', here, is quite simply the meaning! The meaning in connection with which I was trying precisely to carry out, to carry out a cleansing, by asking the question, the question about the tree: what is the tree? And what is it on a very precise point that I designated, because I do not remain up in the air: does it enjoy? Religious froth can then, in short, be also laboratory material! And why not, and why not make use of it because it comes to us with what I call, with what I call by making it entirely tip over to one side, what I call the truth, because of course, it is not the emptied out truth, huh, it is the truth like that flourishing.

There you are. I can all the same clearly indicate to you that it is not for nothing, in short, that there are Jewish biologists, huh. For my part, I have just read something of which moreover I will give you the title... I will give you the title, anyway, it is the book, there, *On sexuality and bacteria*. There is something that, that struck me, anyway, in reading this book which I read with passion from start to finish, because it was along my line, like that, the short is that if, the short is that if the amoeba, ehm... this little piece of filth, there, that you look at in the microscope, there, huh, and then which obviously wriggles, it eats things on you... it... good. It is certain that it enjoys! Well then as regards bacteria, I am questioning myself! Does bacteria enjoy? Well it's funny, huh, the only thing which can, in short, suggest the idea of it to us, is – I can all the same say that it is in Jacob that I discovered it, we must not exaggerate, I had heard like that a rumour... but in this Jacob, who moreover is on this occasion associated with someone called Wollman, what really fascinated me, huh, is that what is characteristic of the aforesaid bacteria is that there is nothing in the world like a bacteria for being infected. It is in a
word that bacteria would contribute absolutely nothing to us if there were not the bacteriophage. And the link that is made by – that is made by: he does not make it, that emerges – but anyway it is certain that, the short that, as his name indicates Jacob is a Jew, is certainly not indifferent that his relationship, his relationship of accumulated, minute, swarming experiences in short, that his report about what happens between bacteria and the bacteriophage, that it is here that we may have the 'feeling', let us say that from infection, from its (188) infection with the bacteriophage, the bacteria eventually enjoys.

And if one looks at it very closely – anyway, consult the text, I am indicating it to you, it will only take a second for you to look through the paperbacks, only its very difficult to find, this yoke is really exhausted, it appeared in America... It really would piss you off! It would be no bad thing all the same for you to make some photocopies. There is perhaps also one in French around, but I cannot say, for my part... I did not rush out looking for it, since I read it in English, anyway, there is also one in French, but I do not even know whether it can still be found. You see the extent of my benevolence, I am indicating it to you just when you are going to enter into the most appalling rivalry with me if I want to get it. Anyway too bad, there are always photocopies...

When all is said and done, it is from there that you can touch on a connection, a very particular connection. If Jacob makes manifest through this that there is sex at the level of bacteria, he only makes it manifest by the following fact - read this book carefully - that between two mutations of bacteria of the same line of descent, in other words of this famous escherichia coli which has served as laboratory material at that level, that between two mutations of bacteria from the same source, what constitutes sex, is that between them, between these mutations, no relationship is possible. This means that one line of descent of bacteria whose mutation consists in a possibility of a greater multiplication than in the other, while it is at the level of this
possibility of multiplying that the other is distinguished:

Joisonnement-plus, fertility they call that in English, fertility-less.

When the more fertile encounter the less fertile, they make them transfer to the side of fertility. While the less fertile, when they go towards the more fertile, for their part, do not make them transfer towards the side of the less fertile. It is then essentially from the non-relationship between the two branches - here we find our little tree again! - it is then from the non-relationship between the two branches of a same tree, that for the first time there is suggested, at the level of bacteria, the idea that there is a sexual specification.

So then you see the register in which this, this may affect me, because, in finding again this non-relationship at a completely different level of this so called evolution of life which is the one by which I specify the speaking being, is all the same something which, in short, which is well designed to hold my attention, and at the same time to try to give (189) you a little whiff of it... Because in short, what that means, is that in its first apparition - which moreover has strictly nothing to do with its second apparition which is a pure homology - sexuality is not at all the same thing, but that it may be so on occasion at the level of the tree, something linked to infection and to nothing else, is all the same, is all the same worth our dwelling on. Naturally, that does not mean either that we should rush into it, huh, you must not rush, especially, because it is, it is the best way to stick your finger in your eye! But anyway, it is tangible. And that, that the question of enjoyment is suggested from infection, sexuality with a limited import, is also worth remembering. Good. When I say: not to rush, huh, that also means: not to let yourself be led by the nose.

Is there - I am making a break here, I am taking things from the other end - is there knowledge in the Real? It is essential that here I should break, since otherwise I, at least you, you have let yourselves up to now be led by the nose, namely, that you stop there where I stop myself, in order not to let myself be led by the same end. To ask the
second question, the one that I am putting forward now, after having allowed myself to be led into religious froth, of what interest is it that now I start over again? It is all the same – it is not difficult to, to sense, is that not so, enjoyment, it erupts (sic) into the Real. And that there will be a moment - which will be later, because things must be carefully put into a series, huh - when the question turns back on itself. What does the Real answer if enjoyment questions it? And that is why I begin – here you see the link – why I begin to ask the question: knowledge is not the same as enjoyment. I will even say more, if there is a point to which I have led you, anyway, in starting from this knowledge that is inscribed in the unconscious, it is indeed because it is not inevitable that knowledge should enjoy itself.

And that indeed is why, now - a break - I am taking up again a thread from a different end, no term of which is encountered in what I first put forward. I am taking up the thread from another end, and I am putting the question about knowledge in the Real. It is quite clear that this question, like all the others, is only asked from the answer. I would even say more: from the answer such as I have already emphasised it. The unconscious in Freud's sense, is that in whose name I asked the question about knowledge in the Real. But I do not ask it in giving to Freud’s unconscious all its import. I am simply saying that the unconscious is at first only conceived of from the (190) following: that it is a knowledge. But I am limiting myself to that. It is in the name of this that the question about knowledge in the Real takes on its meaning.

There is some. And there is no need for Freud’s unconscious for it to be so. There is some to all appearances, otherwise the Real would not work. Here is where I am starting from which as you see is a quite different aspect. This one, precisely, has a Greek aspect. The Real, is like the discourse of the master: it is the Greek discourse. The Real must work. And we cannot see how it would work without there being some knowledge in the Real. So then there also, huh, no
rushing. Here it is not longer a matter of being led by the nose, there, it is to get lined in this step. One must cut through its casing. If I take this step in the Real, I must cut away... all the glue around, in order not to remain stuck in it, huh. And that in the Real, may I dare say, means nothing outside a meaning.

That means in the Real: which does not depend on the idea that I have of it. A further step with the same paste on one’s feet: as regards which, what I think of it does not matter. The Real does not give a damn whether I think of it like that. And this indeed is why the first time that I tried to make this category vibrate, anyway, in the ears of my listeners, those of Sainte-Anne, I cannot say that I was not kind, huh, I said to them: the Real is, is what always returns to the same place. Which is precisely to put it in its place. The notion of place, arises from that.

So then, in saying that, I put the Real – I situate it precisely, I put it in its place, with a meaning, let us not forget, with a meaning *qua* known: the meaning knows itself. So much so that it is astonishing, huh, that people should have become entangled in it: the sensible, the tangible, anything you wish, but that it did not end up by being crystallised: the known meaning (*le sensu*). It must be believed that it had echoes we did not like.

What I am in the process of saying by that, in any case putting forward to you about the Real, is first of all that, it is that the knowledge at stake in the question, is there knowledge in the Real, is to be completely separated from the use of known in the known meaning. It is from meaning, starting from there that I detach the Real, but it is not from the same knowledge that I question to know whether there is a knowledge in the Real. The knowledge at stake in the question is not the order of knowledge which conveys meaning or more exactly, which is conveyed by meaning.
(191) And I am going to illustrate it right away. To illustrate it from Aristotle. It is quite striking that in his *Physics*, Aristotle for a good long while, in short, made the leap, the leap by which, it is demonstrated that his *Physics* has strictly nothing to do with the *physis* whose ghost Heidegger tries to make re-emerge for us. It is because what he is tackling, he is tackling to answer the question which is the one that I am asking now: is there knowledge in the Real? He tackles it by way of the knowledge of the artisan. The short is that the Greeks did not have the same relationship to writing. The flower of what they produced, is drawings, it is the making of plans. That is their idea of intelligence. It is not enough to have an idea of intelligence to be intelligent. This recommendation is especially addressed to you. And it is surprising that it should be Aristotle who proves it to us.

This artisan, God knows what he imputes to him, make no mistake. He imputes to him, first of all, knowing what he wants: which all the same is a bit thick! Where have we ever seen anyone struggling along as an artisan, knowing what he wants? It is Aristotle who lays that on his back. Thanks to Aristotle, the artisan is the ‘final cause’. And then also, while he is at it, I really do not see what stops him, is that not so, he is also the ‘formal cause’, he has ideas, as they say. And then after that, he, be, he causes ‘cause’ (*il cause ‘cause’*), he even causes ‘means’, he causes ‘efficient’ in a word, and it is a lucky thing that Aristotle leaves some bit of the role to matter. There it is: it is the ‘material cause’! It causes, it causes, it causes even without rhyme or reason [*causer* = to cause, or to chat, to bladder on].

Because, to take things, like that, at the level from which they come, namely, the pot – that is how it came out, not at all of course that they only knew how to make that, the Greeks, they knew how to make much more complicated things, but all of that, all of that comes from the pot. When I ask a question of whether there is knowledge in the Real, it is precisely to exclude from this Real what is involved in the
knowledge of the artisan. Not only does the knowledge of the artisan not cause, but it is exactly this order of knowledge that the artisan makes use of because another artisan taught him to do it like that.

And far from the pot having an end, a form, an efficacy and even some matter or other, the pot, is a mode of enjoying. He was taught to enjoy making pots! And if someone did not buy his pot — and that depends on the good sense of the client — if his pot is not bought, well then he has the reward of his enjoyment, namely, that he left with it. (192) and that this does not go very far. It is a mode that is essential to detach from what is at stake when I ask the question: is there knowledge in the Real?

There must all the same simply be some people here who have been, who have been, I don’t know, to the exposition of Chinese archaeological excavations, as it is called, Chinese excavations which were the best thing that they found to send us from the land of Mao.

There you can see — at that level because there are reasons why, in this zone, in short, one can still see the pots at the moment that they emerge. It is quite clear that these pots are absolutely gripping, admirable, is that not so, these pots from the time of the apparition of words, when for the first time, people made pots — three feet are stuck onto them, as it happens, but they are feet which are not feet, feet that are screwed on, you understand, they are feet, feet which are there in continuity with the pot. These are pots which have spouts of which one can say in advance that any mouth is unworthy. They are pots which are in themselves, with their advent, in short things before which one prostrates oneself.

Do you believe that this emergence here, is something... is something that has anything whatsoever to do with Aristotelian decomposition? It is enough to look at these pots to see that in short they are of no use for anything. But there is one thing certain, which is that this grew, is that not so, this grew, in short, like a flower. That Aristotle, finally,
decomposes them, in short, is that not so, con-causes them with at least four different causes, is something that just by itself, in short, demonstrates that the pots are from elsewhere.

But why am I talking to you about them since precisely I put them elsewhere? I am talking to you about them because if it is the client who finally has to judge the pot, in the absence of which the potter, in short will have to tighten his belt, this demonstrates something to us, which is that it is the client who not only buys the pot, but who, ‘potters’ the artisan, it if I can express myself thus. And it is enough to see what follows from this link between the fact that the pot, in short, is so well made that people imagine that God is a potter, exactly like the artisan. The God in question is, is... at one time, anyway, my old friend Andre Breton believed that he was pronouncing a blasphemy in saying that, in saying that God is a pig (un porc). It is not for nothing that the last time I told you that I never encouraged the Surrealists. Not at all that I for my part would abbreviate and I would say that God is a pot. God is clumsy (un empoté)! True, God is the potter, but the potter also is awkward. He is the subject, in short, of the knowledge supposed to his art.

But this is not what is at stake when I ask you the question: is there knowledge in the Real? Because this, this is what was encountered the day when from the Real someone succeeded in tearing out a strand, namely, at the time of Newton, when all the same, it happened, and that there in order that the Real should function, at least the Real of gravity, namely, not nothing, all the same, because we are all screwed to this gravity and by nothing less than our bodies, until we hear differently, not that it is a property of it, as what followed clearly demonstrated – but one is screwed onto this Real. And there, what is it, in short, that worried people in Newton’s time? It was nothing less than this question which I would say, in short, concerned what was at stake, namely, masses – make no mistake. Masses. How these masses could know the distance at which they were at from other
masses so that they would be able to observe Newton's law? It is absolutely clear that God is required here. One cannot, all the same, claim that the masses, the masses as such, namely, defined by their simple inertia, where would the notion come to them of the distance that they are from other masses? And what is more, as regards what is involved in these masses themselves in order to behave correctly? At the time of freshness when this Newtonian lucubration came out, this escaped no one! It was the only notion in short, that — the only notion that could be opposed to him, were Descartes vortices; unfortunately Descartes vortices did not exist and everyone could see that quite clearly... So then, God was required to inform, is that not so, at every instant, in short it has even got to the point that not only was he required to be there to inform the masses at every instant about what was happening to the others, but... it was even supposed that he had perhaps no other means than to push the masses himself with his finger... Which, of course was exaggerated, in short, was exaggerated because it was clear that once acceleration is already inscribed in the formula, time was also there, so then there was no need for the finger of God! But as regards informing all the same, it was difficult to exclude him. And what I am talking to you about, for my part, here, is the knowledge in the Real.

(194) You must not imagine that because Einstein came afterwards and put something else into it, huh, you must not imagine that things are any better, huh, because there is all the same a funny story, is that not so, which is that this relativity of space, which is henceforth de-absolutised, because indeed it is some time, in short since people have been able to say that in short, that after all God was absolute space — indeed that is, that is only banter. But the relativisation of this space with respect to light, this has a funny feel for you of flat space, and that, that has every appearance of starting to put its ass once again into the religious froth. So then, let us exaggerate nothing. It is perhaps here, you understand, that — this is how, in any case for today, I will limit myself, indeed to what made the analyst emerge. You have clearly
sensed, *sennu*, huh, that all of this comes from this short indeed that we have only spoken up to now about what comes from Heaven. Everything that we have of the Real however little sure it is, including our monsters, huh, has uniquely, uniquely come down from heaven. If it were not from there that we had started in order to always return to the same place, the definition that I give of the Real, we would not have today either watches nor televisions nor all these charming things thanks to which you are not only minuted but I would dare to say ‘seconded’. You are so well seconded that you no longer even have living space.

Luckily there is something of the analyst, huh. The analyst – I am going to end on a metaphor: the analyst is the will-o-the-wisp. It is a metaphor which, for its part, does not amount to *flam lux*. It is all that I have to say to excuse him. I mean that it opposes to the stars from which everything has descended in terms of what encumbers you and organises you so well here, indeed, to listen to my discourse, is that not so. Namely, that this has absolutely nothing to do with what you will come in to complain to me in a moment.

The only advantage that I find in this will-o-the-wisp, is that this does not amount to *flam lux*. The will-o-the-wisp does not illuminate anything, it emerges even ordinarly from some pestilence. That is its strength. This is what can be said, starting from the will-o-the-wisp, whose thread I will try to take up, the wisp of thread, the next time.
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The non-dupes-err... That does not mean that the dupes do not err. If we start from what is proposed as an affirmation - can you hear? Can you hear like that, if I am in front of this thing? Would the person who said that he can hear nothing answer: can he hear? Let us say that there is introduced by this affirmation that the non-non-dupes, may well, no more, not err. But already, this introduces us to the question that is posed by double negation. To be... not to be a non dupe, does that come back to being a dupe? This supposes, and supposes nothing less, than that there is a universe; that one can put forward that the universe, is divided by every statement; that one can say 'the man', and that if one says it - I mean to say it - all the rest becomes non-man.

A logician - because I am putting forward that logic is the science of the real - a logician took a step a long time after Aristotle. We had to wait for Boole to publish in 1853 An investigation of the laws of thought, which, has already this advantage over Aristotle of being a step, an attempt to stick to what he claims to observe, to found in short a post erior as constituting the laws of thought. What does he do? He writes very precisely what I have just told you, namely that starting from anything whatsoever that is said and that is stated, and things are such for him that he cannot but put forward the idea of the universe, he symbolises it by a number (un chiffre), a number which is appropriate for it, it is the number 1. He will write then, about
anything that is proposed as notable, notable in this universe, he will
(196) then write x, he leaves this x empty, because this is the principle
of the use of this letter it is whatever may be notable in the universe
[to Gloria Gonzales: if you would carry that away from me, it would
help me to go to the board]. Yes, x, he writes, multiplied by 1–x; this
cannot but equal zero:

\[ x(1 - x) = 0 \]

This cannot but, provided one gives this meaning to multiplication,
but note the intersection. That is where he starts from. It is in so far
as x is notable in the universe that something is sustained simply by
no, to men there being opposed non-men as such, everything that
subsists as notable being here considered as subsisting as such. Now,
it is clear that what is notable is not as such individual; that already in
this way of positing logical ek-sistence, there is something which,
from the start, appears to be awkward.

How does it happen that there should be posited without criticism, the
theme, the theme of the universe that is posited? If I believe this year
to be able to support by the Borromean knot something, something
which, certainly, is not, is not a definition of the subject, of the subject
as such of a universe, it is in that, I will remark once again, my
attempt has nothing metaphysical about it. I mean, I mean in this
connection that metaphysics is what is distinguished by supposing, by
supposing as such the subject, the subject of a knowing
(connaissance). It is in so far as it supposes a subject, that
metaphysics is distinguished from what I am trying to articulate the
elements of, namely, those of a practice, and this along the line of
having defined it as distinguishing itself, distinguishing itself from
something which is pure place, pure topology, and which means that
there be generated from there the definition situated only from the
place of this practice, from what is announced, from then on is
advanced as being three other discourses. This is a fact, a fact of

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discourse, a fact by which I try to give to analytic discourse its place of ek-sistence.

What is it, that properly speaking, that ek-sists? There only ek-sists as the spelling by which I modified this term stresses, there only ek-sists in any practice something that acts as a foundation of the saying (du dire), I mean what the saying contributes as an agency in this practice. It is under this heading that I try to situate under these three terms, the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, the triple category which makes a knot, and by this gives its meaning to this practice. For this (197) practice has not simply a meaning, but gives rise to a type of meaning that illuminates the other meanings to the point of putting them in question again, I mean by suspending them. With that, as an articulation, an articulation which at the end of a progress made to stimulate among those who sustain this practice, the idea of what for them this Real is, I say: the Real is writing. The writing of nothing other than this knot as it is written to say it, as it is written when it is according to the law of flattened out writing. And I submit what I am stating to this test of putting in suspense the distinction, the precisely subjective distinction of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, in so far as they might in a way already carry with them a meaning, a meaning which would hierarchise them, would make a 1,2,3 of them. Naturally, this would not avoid us falling again into another meaning – as already it may have appeared to you by the fact of what I emphasise about the association of the Real with a three, of the Imaginary with a two, and of the Real precisely – [a slip by Lacan] – and of the Symbolic precisely with the One.

Something in, at the level, in the terms of the Symbolic, is posited as One. Is it a One sustainable from any individuation in the universe? That is the question that I ask, and from now on, I will put it forward under this form, namely, to ask the question in connection with Boole’s writing. If the One that Boole advances as sufficient to divide up the truth, if there is an x, it is only true if, if the x subtracted from
the One is something different to all the rest, than all the rest of the nameable. It is nothing less than gripping to note that Boole himself, by writing what results, what results from the writing of these terms in a mathematical formula, should be led to found on it that the proper of any x, of any x qua stated, is that x minus x equals 0, which is written:

\[ x - x^2 = 0 \]
\[ x = x^2 \]

I mean to be supported by a mathematical formula.

It is strange that here a note in his book, a book whose date I gave you earlier, the major date in this sense that it is starting from there that a new… a new start is taken by logical speculation, and that someone Charles Sanders Peirce of whom I already spoke to you, can for example ameliorate, according to him, Boole’s formulation by showing in it that at certain points the result of it can be that it goes (198) astray, let us say. This to highlight what results from functions of two variables, namely, not simply x but x and y, and showing in it that which… that where I myself believed I ought to take up that the function described as relationship, can here serve to show us that, as regards what is involved in the sexual, this relationship cannot be written.

Why, Boole asks himself, rather than writing \( x = x^2 \) and the inverse, cannot one write \( x = x^3 \)? It is striking that Boole – and this starting from the notion of truth as radically separating what is involved between the One and the zero, because it is by zero that he connotes error – it is striking that this universe, from then on solitary as such with the function of truth appears to him to limit the writing, the writing of what is involved in the logical function, to the second power of x while he refuses the third power. He refuses it because of the fact that mathematically, it would only be supposable in writing by adding to it a new term of the product, which he certainly does not
refuse when what is at stake is to make the operation of multiplication work, he writes on this occasion:

\[ x \cdot y \cdot z \]

and he can, according to the case, mark that \( x \cdot y \cdot z \) such that the variables were situated by a certain function, that \( x \cdot y \cdot z \) for example also equals 0. But since he limits himself to the values zero and one, it can just as well take on the function, the function taking its value from a certain... from a certain ciphering of zero and one for each of the three – he can, by making \( x, y \) and \( z \) each equal to one, notice that zero is not the fruit of it.

So then, what can prevent him from adding to his \((1 - x) \cdot (1 + x)\) and to add it not as addition, to add it as a term of multiplication? He sees then very clearly that \((1 - x)\) multiplied by \((1 + x)\) giving \(1 - x^2\), he will end up, I do not need to underline it for you, with this: the fact is that \(x - x^3\) will be equal to zero and from this fact \(x\) will be equal to \(x^3\):

\[
\begin{align*}
x(1 - x)(1 + x) &= 0 \\
x - x^3 &= 0 \\
x &= x^3
\end{align*}
\]

Why does he stop, stop at what? In the interpretation of what this \(x\) might be precisely as added to the universe. Is it not proper to what (199) ek-sists the universe, to be added to it? This is properly what we do every day, and precisely what I designate by a plus in supporting it by the small \(\alpha\)-object. But then this suggests to us, this suggests the following: namely, to ask ourselves whether the One in question, is well and truly the universe, to be considered as a set or collection of everything that can be individualised in it.

I suggest – there is suggested to me, let us say in connection with this writing of Boole – founding what he establishes in terms of universe – because it is as such that he articulates it, that he gives it its meaning – to suppose that this One, far from arising from the universe, arises

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from enjoyment. From enjoyment and not just from any enjoyment, from the enjoyment called phallic, and this in so far as analytic experience demonstrates its importance. That from this sequence of what is posited as logical as signifier, but literal, I mean inscribable, in so far as the inscription is where there arises in our experience the function of the Real, at least if you follow me, that something like an \( x \) can be added to this enjoyment, and constitute what I already defined as grounding surplus enjoying (plus-de-jour).

It remains that Boole is far from not indicating that it is not simply the relationship of enjoyment to surplus enjoying, in so far as surplus enjoying is supposed to be precisely what ek-sists, ek-sists with respect to what? Precisely the knot whose use and function I am trying for the moment to illuminate for you. He sees very clearly that in order to end up with the function \( x = x^3 \) and no longer simply \( x^2 \), he sees very clearly that the third term, the term \( (1 + x) \) can be written differently and specifically \( (-1 -x) \). I mean \( (-1 -x) \) taken in brackets, which is equivalent mathematically – I mean in so far as writing is what is mathematical – what can be inscribed here by minus before the brackets and by \( (1 + x) \), put on the inside:

\[ -(1 + x) \]

I write \(- (1 + x) \) and I say that it is the equivalent to the addition here of \( (-1 -x) \) and that Boole adds them in order to reject them, to reject them in so far as logic is supposed to be designed to assure the status of the truth.

But for the moment, what we are aiming at, is not to give its status to the truth, since the truth, we say, is never stated except from a half-saying, that it is properly speaking unthinkable, except at the locus of the saying, to mark that a proposition is not true, and to mark it with a bar, with an upper bar that excludes it, and marks it with the sign of false.
(200) In the order of things, in so far as the symbol is designed to exist it in this order of things, it is properly, whatever may be said, whatever Boole may say studying or claiming to establish the status of thought, it is unthinkable, precisely, it is unthinkable to split anything whatsoever nameable, to split by a pure no to designate what is not named. Does this mean that we ought to put to the test, put to the test what results from $x^3 = x$, assuredly it is already something to see functioning in it this three by which I mark as such the Real, and this is where we are going to take up again our Borromean knot.

I would like once more to give the example of the fact that even if the statement of the Borromean knot ek-sists with respect to analytic practice, it is what permits it to be supported in this space of ours. And this without our knowing, at the present time, despite Aristotle’s quotations, what the number of the dimensions of this space is, I mean even the one where we name things. Look, this is the same thing as what I first drew on the board, namely, that we have here a ring, a ring of string as I precisely called it the first time that I introduced this function.

Here is the ring of string, the three rings of string. You see that they hold together. They hold together in so far as there is here one which I put on the horizontal, the two others being vertical and the verticals crossing over one another. It is obvious that this cannot be unknotted. The Borromean knot as such has made a lot of people here work, and
they have even sent me the testimony of this. This is the simplest form.

(201) It is striking that in the works – it is veritable works that have been sent to me on this point – works which do their share in all sorts of other ways, they are innumerable, to knot these three in such a way that they allow, with the unknotting of a single one of the three rings, exactly to free all the others, and as I told you, whatever may be the number of them. But to limit ourselves to three, since this three goes with our three functions of the Imaginary the Symbolic and the Real, this very precisely not to distinguish them, to see up to what point the fact that they are three, and by this fact to construct from them the very logic of the Real. Namely, to see at what moment we are going to be able to see arising, simply from these three, strictly equivalent, as you can immediately see – from these three to give rise to the beginning of what would be differentiation in it. Differentiation is initiated, is initiated from the fact, and I am astonished that in the works that I have received, no one has pointed it out to me, here you are: through these three as they are arranged here, there are determined let us say eight quadrants, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8. I take one of them, any one whatsoever, and from this quadrant I pull the flattened out one, the one that you are going to see – you are going to see from where you are, but by being where I am, it is certainly exactly the same, namely, that you see that something is already found there, because of this flattening out, is found to be already oriented. I mean that you certainly see the same inscription of the knot which is the one that I see, namely, on this occasion, for what I have shown you, by having taken my knot in the way it has been depicted, the fact is that by the flattening out something is outlined that is inscribed in following out its shape, which is inscribed as dextrogyratory.

Once it is flattened out as it is and turned over, I know in advance that it is the same dextrogyratory. It is enough to do this small job, indeed to imagine the turning over – and this also can be written – you will
see that it is not the mirror image, that in turning over the Borromean knot you do not see something which is its mirror image.

Fig. XIII-2

(202) Does this not render all the more striking this fact: it is that in taking up again my quadrants — let’s say that I chose earlier — I do not know if it is effectively what I did — that one for you on the top right — if I take this one, that not only as I said on the top and at the right but I also say, in front, if I take the one no longer on the top right and in front, but below on the left behind, the one that is strictly opposite it and if it is from there that I start to flatten it out in the same way that I previously did, it is quite notable — and you can verify it — that what will result from this flattening out will be a way in which the knot is squeezed, in which the knot is tightened in the exactly inverse way, namely, laevogyratory.

There comes out then from the simple handling already of the Borromean knot, there arises a distinction which is of the order of orientation. If one is in the clockwise direction, the other is in the inverse direction. We must certainly not be astonished, be astonished that something of this order can happen, because it is in the nature of things that space should be oriented. It is even from there that there proceeds the function described as that of mirror image, and of all symmetry.

I apologise for the asperity of what my discourse today implies. Simply, I note for you that this fact of orientation for the opposite
quadrants is something that already indicates to us that it is in (203) conformity with the structure, from the simple fact that the orientation arises from the single support from the single nodal support for which here I take up arms. It is conceivable from these rings themselves to mark a direction in them, namely, an orientation. In other words, to take the last, the one that is written here (1), to ask ourselves the question about what results from making use of an orientation in conformity with the one that we have abstained from of two species [?] and of two species alone which are different, namely, to Realise that there will result from it a figure, a figure such that its periphery will mark by that fact the same orientation. What is required for one of these figures to be transformed into the other, namely, this one equally completed (2)? You have seen from my hesitation the very mark of the difficulty that is encountered in the handling of the aforesaid rings of string. This is the mirror image of the other. But what is enough to transform the one into the other? 

Something which is definable in the following very simple way: namely, that, as you see the Borromean knot itself displayed, you see that any one of them is manifested by cutting each of the two others in such a way that the one being freed, the one being sectioned, the two others are free. Which means that one of these rings can turn around one of the two others, and that this all by itself will give us a new Borromean knot. The law of what is happening on this occasion is the following: here you only have to – I apologise for not having coloured chalk, it would be better, I am drawing it in chalk – what happens if we fold back one of these knots, one of these rings, around another?
This is exactly what we get – from this we get a new figure which – I’m going to rub out the old one so that you can see it better – we get a new figure which has as a property to be of this kind. Namely, that, (204) you see – this one is rubbed out – namely, that you see it, the figure is presented in this way, we have this which has remained invariable, and two others…two other elements. There you are: the two other elements present the sort of orientation which is the one defined here…namely, that, as compared, is that not so, to this…this being marked by $a$ for example you will subsequently have a presentation like this, namely, if this is $b$, you will have an inversion of direction from the $b$ and of the $c$ and an inversion of orientation of their curves, things being completed in the following way. There you are.

What matters is the following: it is to see that, by inverting the $a$ what results from it, is a totally different orientation of the tightening of the knot. Namely, that from the simple fact that we have turned over one of the rings, the two other elements, those that we have not inverted, the two other elements change direction. I mean that, as is conceivable, the segment, the segment that I section in this mess, the segment that is found to be sectioned by the turning over of this ring which was first of all there, the segment has changed direction.

Namely, that to one, to this one here, this other segment and this one has fitted here in a way that we will call if you wish, centripetal, while previously the three were centrifugal. This indeed is why, when we turn over a further ring of string, this ring of string will remain in its primal orientation for the segment itself that we are going to have to
turn over. Namely, that if now, after having turned over $a$ we turn over $b$, $b$ will find itself keeping this centripetal direction, but then it is these two others, namely, one centrifugal and the other centripetal, that will be inverted so that the result of this will be that the centripetal becomes centrifugal and the centrifugal becomes centripetal, we will have here anew one centrifugal and two centripetal. But the one that will be centrifugal will be one of the turned over centripetals.

Do have to do all of that again, or has someone followed it?

I exposed myself to, to not even looking at notes, for this simple reason, which is that the very difficult of handling, the so small imaginable, as one might say, of this Borromean knot from which we are trying to draw some profit, is the very thing that that I am not unhappy, in short, to highlight, is that not, so to highlight a way... of... there you are, after the second circuit, is that not so, a laevogyratory that has been reproduced like the preceding one, is that not so, and it is (205) in so far as we have turned over the $b$ after having turned over the $a$ that we obtain the following: that we have a centripetal in place of a centrifugal which is here, and a centrifugal at the place of the centripetal which is here, is that not so. As a consequence, we have here $c$, $a$, and $b$. (handwritten)

I was asked the question, I was asked the question in a place where people were working, I was asked the question as to what relationship this Borromean knot had with what I have stated about the four — I would say — options, described as sexed identification. In other words, what relationship this might have with the

\[ \exists x \cdot \phi x \quad \exists x \cdot \phi \neg x \]

\[ \forall x \cdot \phi x \quad \forall x \cdot \phi \neg x \quad \text{Fig. XIII-1} \]

I am now going to try to tell you. Suppose that we give to this this position in a quadrant that we designate according to the mark in
Cartesian co-ordinates, the eight quadrants in question. You should be able to see, to notice that, let us take the top right quadrant in front, it is by folding over – ah, finally... good there you are! – it is by the folding back of the ring of string marked here, I mean in so far as this ring of string, this one then, is held – there you are – in so far as this ring of string is held by this one, namely, the one that I will call the ‘in depth’, we will call this one here ‘the top’, and this one here ‘the flat’.

Good, so then the flat comes here... and it is the one that comes there [Lacan demonstrates with a knot that he has in his hand], so then, green, blue, red. This is how things will present themselves. Good.

(206) It is a little bit... a little bit different. There you are. You will have to take a bit of trouble, yourselves, to make the things, because after all, I note that it doesn’t work out all that easily. Good.

The important thing is the following: it is, it is to indicate that it is by folding back this one, namely, the vertical towards the in depth; by folding back this one, is that not so, namely, the one that was first of all well marked at its place here, it is by folding it back in this way that we are going to get the ring, the Borromean knot as it is situated in this quadrant on the left of whatever quadrant we started from. In this quadrant, then, with inversion, inversion of the laevogyral, is that not so, namely, a passage to the dextrogyral, because the one that I did at the bottom was a laevogyral. I took it that way because in the way that the knots are arranged – the way that the rings of string are arranged, this is how it is knotted. So then here we have
an inversion. Which means that, to take things by placing them like here for example, in this quadrant there, is that not so, we have to pass into this one, we have a first inversion. By passing into this one, we have a second inversion, as in some direction — on condition that it is a direction of symmetry with respect to one of the planes of intersection we have, at the three extremities, a change in the Borromean knot, we have an inversion. Good, if we pass along here, namely, that we go through it from the top to the bottom we have a new inversion, namely, a return of what was here, of the laevogyratory. These operations are commutative, namely, that by passing in this way, we arrive at the same return.

(207) In others words, it is at the four opposite points, namely, on the eight quadrants of four definable quadrants by as I might say the inscription in the cube of a tetrahedron, it is with that that we are going to see appearing four homogenous figures, all three, on this occasion, laevogyratory, since we have started from a laevogyratory. Good. What results from this? How consider this multiplication, as I might say, by four, from what results from simply the flattening out, or the writing of the Borromean knot. I propose simply something that, given the time, I will only be able to give a commentary on the next time, it is this. If, as you have just seen, what is at stake is a tetrahedral figure, a tetrahedral figure in so far as it is produced by the tipping over of two of the rings of string, and one can say two, whatever they are. Whatever they are, we come back to the laevogyratory figure, to specify it. We come back to it whatever the one of the two that has been folded over. There will remain one which has not been folded over. The one that remains is obviously the third, I mean the one that remains after the two others have been folded over. That for example, if we make of these rings of string, the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, what will remain in short, and what will remain in a centrifugal position, this again I would have to verify for you. I mean that you should be able to see that it is by tipping over the S and the I that at the end the R remains centrifugal.
There is a good reason for that. If you have clearly seen the last figure, it is the R, namely, let us say the Real, that must be tipped over to obtain the last figure, which itself will be dextrogyratory and will be entirely centrifugal. It is a convenient way for you to remember what is involved in the second phase of what happens after two tipping overs, since you ought as I showed you, you ought shortly find in the strictly opposite quadrant, the one about which I spoke to you when I made this remark to you, this remark that was not found, namely, that in passing from one quadrant to the strictly opposite quadrant, to the contradictory quadrant, to the diagonal quadrant, we obtain a knot, a knot no more if we start from the laevogyratory – we obtain a dextrogyratory knot. Good.

So then, verify all of this when you have a chance, in short, by making small manipulations like the ones that I made such a mess of before you and you will see in short the following: that by staying with the laevogyratory knot, we obtain what I qualified or specified as a tetrahedron, because you see how things happen. You can make, reconstitute: here for example you have to take one of the faces of the (208) square, you pull it, you reconstitute the cube, you reconstitute the cube starting from this, the fact is that it is always in a diagonal arrangement with respect to one of the faces of the cube that there are found the quadrants which are of the same kind of orientation and specifically on this occasion, of the laevogyratory kind.

I am simply going to suggest the following to you: this is what comes out of it starting from the function of enjoyment, what comes out is the following: it is that somewhere in one of these extremities of the tetrahedron somewhere there is situated the

\[ \exists x, \Phi x \text { there is no } x \text { to say no to } \Phi \text { of } x \]

somewhere, and we are going to put it,

\[ \exists x, \Phi x \text { there is something which says no to } \Phi \text { of } x \]

somewhere, there is
\( \forall x, \exists x \) namely, that all (tous) are a function of it

And that somewhere, you have:

\( \forall x, \exists \neg x \) not all (pas-toutes)

It is not for nothing that I put it in this form, namely, a basic form.

We will have in a way to put the following in question: the not (pas), not the exclusive not like the earlier one, the step of what exists by saying no to the phallic function. We will on the other hand have what says yes to it, but which is reduplicated, namely, that there is the all, on the one hand, and on the other hand the not-all (pas-tous) in other words what I qualified as not-all (pas-toutes). Does it not appear to you that we have here a programme, namely, to take in what is a subject to be examined, to take the criticism of what is involved in the not, of what is implied by the saying no, namely, the interdiction, (209) and very specifically, when all is said and done, that which specifying itself by the saying no to the \( \exists x \) function, says no to the phallic function.

Saying no to the phallic function, is what we call, in the analytic discourse:

\[ \exists x, \neg \Phi x \] the function of castration

There is what says yes to the phallic function, and says it as all, namely, very specifically a certain type which is altogether necessitated by the definition of what we call man. You know that the not-all very essentially served to mark that there is no the woman, namely, that there are only as I might say the diverse and in a way one
by one, and that all of this finds itself in a way dominated by the
privileged function of the following, that there is nevertheless not-one
to represent the saying that prohibits, namely, the absolutely-no.
Voilà.

So then because there is an exam now, I simply began the thing today.
I beg your pardon for having spent so long on it, we will take it up the
next time.