This study aims to assess tortious causation from a legal, and practicable perspective but draws firstly on the work of the leading philosophical exponents of same in order that it may be viewed in a context which most naturally exhibits the difficulties of finding a general theory. An examination is then made of the questions of causation which are juristically determined by that which is known as the 'but for' test. Therewith, the limits of the said test are analysed in connection with the more difficult areas of determining tactual causation; such present evidential difficulties which strike at the very essence of common-sensical understanding. It is argued that the courts resolve such issues by obscuring the divisions between the tortious elements of establishing culpability viz. duty, breach and damage. It is not dismissed that this is exacted as a result of policy orientated goals, but nonetheless, it is emphasised that such goals play a lesser part in decision-making than that which the preservation of certainty does. That is to say, policy, in regard to causal issues, takes on a different meaning than for example that which is strictly based upon communitarian objectives. Indeed, it is questionable whether in fact the judicial espousal of policy as a basis for decision-making is a sound one, in regard to this area of tort law. And similar is argued with regard to ‘common-sense'. Remoteness of damage is analysed with particular regard to the two landmark decisions of the twentieth century: Re Polemis and The Wagon Mound. Both of which are the 'cause' of a vast amount of literature on the topic; and the subsequent divergence and/or diffusion of the two test of foreseeability namely 'reasonable foreseeability' and that of 'direct consequences' presents a mountain's worth of material from which space permits, what is comparatively, a ‘molehill’ of a chapter.